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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Your banker says that you can buy a house worth half a million, yet you have only one
hundred thousand. He lends the remaining four hundred thousand to you and accepts the
house as collateral. As everybody knows, this is the usual way to buy a house. It is also
well known that the widespread practice of such collateralized borrowing can create enor-
mous momentum at the aggregate level. Recently, the United States, Spain and Ireland
experienced spectacular housing booms followed by busts with severe economic repercus-
sions. At the heart of such dynamics lies a simple and powerful mechanism. With rising
house prices, the wealth and borrowing capacity of households also rise. As a consequence,
they can bid up prices even further, which reinforces the housing boom. The dynamics
are even more dramatic when prices move the other way. Suppose prices start to fall.
Then, homeowners can borrow less with their homes as collateral. Some are no longer able
to renew their mortgages, thus they have to sell their houses. This reduces the price of
housing further, which leads to more sales, ending in a crash.
Clearly, mortgages are the most prominent type of collateralized borrowing. However,
houses are by no means the only assets used as collateral, and consumers are not the only
economic agents that engage in collateralized borrowing. Producers use buildings, vehicles
and machinery as collateral, while investors use bonds, stocks and commodities. In my
dissertation, I model producers and investors who borrow on collateral. In both cases, I
find that dynamics similar to the case of a housing bust may occur: A drop in the price of
the collateral asset forces collateral constrained agents to sell these assets, which reduces
the price further, thus forces additional sales, and thereby causes severe aggregate effects.
1
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In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I study the impact of collateral constraints on producers
and thereby on aggregate output. In a theoretical paper, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show
that collateral constraints that restrict the investment decisions of producers can strongly
amplify and propagate aggregate shocks. However, the subsequent quantitative literature
tends to find rather weak and non-robust effects of collateral constraints. I try to improve
on this by modeling the interaction between idiosyncratic risk and collateral constraints.
To this aim, agents’ productivities as workers and entrepreneurs are assumed to evolve
stochastically. This leads to a perpetual mismatch between wealth and skills, which is
the reason for collateralized borrowing in this economy. The advantage of this modeling
strategy is threefold. First, the evolution of skills can be measured empirically. In contrast,
the heterogeneity in patience that the previous literature assumes to excite collateralized
borrowing is not even intended as a serious micro-foundation. Second, idiosyncratic risk
creates a non-degenerate distribution of wealth. As a consequence, the percentage of con-
strained agents changes as shocks hit the economy. Among other things, this generates
recessions that are much sharper than booms. Last but not least, the impact of collateral
constraints turns out to be larger and more robust in the setup with idiosyncratic risk
compared to models with heterogeneity in patience.
In the baseline calibration, an unanticipated shock that reduces total factor productivity
(TFP) by one percent for only one year leads to a sharp and persistent drop in both output
and the price of capital. One period after the shock, output is down by almost two percent
and the price of capital by more than seven percent. Four years after the shock, the price
of capital is still depressed by some four percent, and it takes about eight years until the
economy roughly returns to its steady state. In contrast, without financing frictions the
model economy is back at the steady state within one year. Thus, collateral constraints
have a substantial impact on the aggregate economy. At the center of this impact is a
reallocation of capital: When the shock hits, the wealth of constrained entrepreneurs falls
by almost 30 percent, mainly due to the fall in the price of capital. This makes them re-
duce their capital holdings by nearly 25 percent. Conversely, unconstrained entrepreneurs
increase their capital holdings to take advantage of the low prices. However, they operate
at lower marginal returns. Thus, capital is now used less efficiently, which implies lower
aggregate output. On top of that story and in contrast to the previous literature, the
3dynamics in my model are also driven by an increase in the number of agents that are
constrained. It goes up by more than 35 percent on impact, and after four years it is still
10 percent above the steady state level.
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Michael Grill, Felix Ku¨bler and Karl Schmedders,
we study the impact of collateral constraints on investors and thereby on asset prices. We
consider an exchange economy with long-lived assets that pay risky dividends and can be
used as collateral for short-term loans. Investors are heterogeneous with respect to risk-
aversion. As a consequence, risk-tolerant agents invest in the risky assets and use them as
collateral to borrow from the risk-averse. This investment behavior makes the risk-tolerant
agents vulnerable to bad shocks in which case binding collateral constraints force them to
sell some of their risky assets. The risk-averse buy these assets only after their price has
dropped substantially. For this reason, collateral constraints increase the volatility of asset
returns by 50 percent as compared to a benchmark where borrowing is not possible. We
show that the high volatility does not substantially decrease when we allow for defaultable
bonds. We also find that such bonds are only traded if the costs of default are small.
The main focus of our analysis is on the case of two risky assets, where the collateral
requirement is determined endogenously for one, but exogenously for the other. In par-
ticular, we assume that a regulating agency sets an exogenous margin requirement for
the second asset. We find that this regulation has a strong impact on the volatility of
the first asset. In particular, a tightening of margin requirements for the regulated asset
uniformly decreases volatility of the unregulated asset. For the regulated asset, tighter
margins initially increase the return volatility, but then decrease it once margins become
very large. Moreover, we find that regulation can substantially decrease volatility, if it is
strict in booms and loose in recessions. This result holds true both for the model with a
single asset as well as the two-asset economy and suggests a strong policy recommendation
for counter-cyclical margin requirements.
In the calibration of the model, we allow for the possibility of disaster states as in Barro
and Jin (2011). This leads to very large quantitative effects of collateral requirements and
to realistic equity risk premia.
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Summing up, Chapters 2 and 3 show within very different frameworks that collateral con-
straints can have a big impact on aggregate dynamics. In Table 1.1, I summarize the main
properties of the two models and thus show the various differences.
What the two models have in common is that they require sophisticated numerical pro-
cedures to compute equilibria. In both cases, these procedures include a time iteration
algorithm: The period-to-period equilibrium conditions are solved backwards in time, i.e.
given today’s state of the economy and also agents’ expectations concerning what happens
next period, the algorithm solves for their optimal choices today. To go back one more
period in time, one takes the computed choices of this period as an input, which means
that they need to be interpolated. At this stage, collateral constraints cause problems, as
they typically imply that choices, also called policies, have kinks at locations that are a
priori unknown. This is because a collateral constraint that becomes binding forces the
marginal choice of agents to change abruptly. Where this happens, the policy function
exhibits a kink, or mathematically speaking, a non-differentiability.
In Chapter 4, which is joint work with Michael Grill, we propose a method that overcomes
the above described numerical problem caused by collateral constraints. It applies not
only to collateral constraints, but to any type of occasionally binding constraint. More-
over, the method also works when policy functions need to be interpolated over several
dimensions. The method uses the equilibrium conditions of the model to numerically lo-
cate the kinks in policy functions and then adds interpolation nodes exactly there. To
handle the resulting non-uniform grid of interpolation nodes, it uses simplicial interpola-
tion, which is piecewise-linear interpolation on efficiently chosen simplices (i.e. triangles in
two dimensions, thetrahedra in three). Therefore, we call this method Adaptive Simplicial
Interpolation (ASI). To evaluate its performance, we embed ASI into a time iteration al-
gorithm. We then compute recursive equilibria in an infinite horizon endowment economy
where heterogeneous agents trade in a bond and a stock subject to various trading con-
straints. A careful analysis shows that ASI computes equilibria accurately and outperforms
standard interpolation schemes by far.
5chapter 2 3
title
Collateral Constraints,
Collateral Requirements
and Asset Prices
Idiosyncratic Risk,
and Aggregate Fluctuations
agents
heterogeneity
heterogeneous skills: heterogeneous preferences:
workers and entrepreneurs risk-averse and risk-tolerant
who is borrowing entrepreneurs risk-tolerant investors
reason for borrowing good business opportunities risky investment opportunities
assets
collateral asset(s) one type of capital two dividend paying assets
supply of positive and subject to adjust-
positive and fixed
collateral assets ment costs (fixed in baseline)
net supply of bonds zero zero
default in equilibrium no default default
interest rate endogenous endogenous
collateral constraints endogenous endogenous and exogenous
dynamics
idiosyncratic risk shocks to individual skills none
aggregate risk unanticipated shocks to TFP anticipated shocks to output
main variables studied prices and output prices
reason why constrained entrepreneurs constrained investors
prices fall with high marginal returns with low risk-aversion
in bad times have to sell capital have to sell risky assets
impact of
strong and persistent strong and persistent
collateral constraints
Table 1.1: Overview and Comparison of the Models in Chapters 2 and 3
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Chapter 2
Collateral Constraints, Idiosyncratic
Risk, and Aggregate Fluctuations
2.1 Introduction
In an economy where loans have to be collateralized by productive assets, shocks can be
amplified strongly through their impact on asset prices. In a nutshell, this works as fol-
lows. Suppose a shock reduces the productivity or the price of productive assets. This
hits those entrepreneurs most who heavily borrowed using these assets as collateral. If
they already hold as much debt as the value of their collateral allows, they are forced to
reduce their debt and sell assets to those agents who are not collateral constrained. As the
unconstrained operate at lower marginal returns, this implies lower aggregate output. It
also leads to a further reduction in asset prices, thus reinforcing the initial impact. More-
over, as constrained entrepreneurs invest less today they are worse off in the future, which
reduces future asset prices. This in turn reinforces the drop in today’s prices.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) brilliantly present this mechanism in a very stylized model.
There are two types of risk-neutral agents, patient and impatient. The impatient agents
operate linear technologies and borrow from the patient ones as much as the collateral
constraint allows. Subsequent papers move towards less stylized assumptions to be better
able to quantify the impact of collateral constraints. In Kocherlakota (2000) entrepreneurs
are risk-averse, operate concave technologies, and lend money from foreigners. This small
open economy assumption implies a constant interest rate as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
7
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where this is a consequence of risk-neutrality. In contrast, Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) as-
sume that lenders are risk-averse which makes the interest rate truly endogenous. They
also endogenize labor supply. In addition, Mendicino (2008) assumes inefficiencies in debt
enforcement that imply tighter collateral constraints. Finally, Pintus (2011) considers
agents that differ not only in patience but also in risk-aversion and their intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. With respect to the quantitative impact of collateral constraints,
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) find that amplification is sizable only for extreme parameter
values. Mendicino (2008) and Pintus (2011) provide slightly more promising results, but
still need some strong assumptions. Overall, there is no consensus in the literature and
the agnostic conclusion of Kocherlakota (2000) is still up to date: “This sets up a chal-
lenge for future work: to demonstrate, in a carefully calibrated model environment, that the
amplification and propagation possible by credit constraints are quantitatively significant.”
This paper presents a calibrated model that departs from the assumption that agents differ
in discount factors. Instead, it assumes a continuum of agents who face idiosyncratic risk
concerning their productivity as workers and entrepreneurs. In such a setup, the reason
for borrowing is that idiosyncratic shocks create a perpetual mismatch between wealth and
the skills needed to make productive use of it. Clearly, wealth and talent do not always go
hand in hand in the real world. Moreover, from the perspective of economic modeling, re-
placing heterogeneous preferences by idiosyncratic risk has the following three advantages.
First of all, the process driving the evolution of skills can be empirically measured. Specifi-
cally, I build on Quadrini (2000) and Boha´cek (2006) when calibrating the process governing
entrepreneurial skills. In contrast, extreme differences in patience are not even intended
as a serious micro-foundation, as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) admit: “A weakness of our
model is that it provides no analysis of who becomes credit constrained, and when.”
Second, thanks to a non-degenerate distribution of wealth, the percentage of constrained
agents changes as shocks hit the economy. As a consequence, the relation between the
magnitude of an impulse and the size of the response is markedly non-linear. In partic-
ular, a negative shock depresses the economy by more than a positive shock of the same
magnitude boosts it. This may help explain why recessions are sharper than booms.
Third and most importantly, it turns out that amplification and propagation are stronger
and more robust in this model than in models where two types of agents differ in discount
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factors. The grounds for this surprising result are that in the latter models all borrowers
are constrained and they are all extremely impatient. This necessitates a dramatic drop
in the demand for credit in case of a negative shock, which leads to a sharp decline in
the interest rate and thus mitigates the impact of collateral constraints. In contrast, the
interest rate reacts only moderately in my model, as two counteracting effects are at work:
Unconstrained agents take up additional credit and the constrained agents react to the
shock by consuming much less, as they are not overly impatient.
In setting up the model, I follow three objectives. First, idiosyncratic risk shall be included
in a reasonable way. Second, the model shall allow for an acceptable calibration. Finally,
the model shall be as close to the previous literature on collateral constraints as the first
two objectives admit. The details of the model are as follows. There is a continuum of in-
finitely lived agents with homogeneous preferences of the Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffmann
(GHH) type. They have heterogeneous skills which follow i.i.d. Markov chains, so that
some agents are entrepreneurs, while others are workers, either low skilled or high skilled.
Workers save due to a precautionary motive while entrepreneurs take up debt to buy cap-
ital. They employ their capital in agent-specific linear technologies to create differentiated
intermediate goods, which are then combined with labor to produce the final output good.
As the intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes for each other, the price of a good falls
as its supply rises, and therefore entrepreneurs face decreasing returns to their investment
in capital. As a consequence, poor entrepreneurs want to exploit their high marginal re-
turns and borrow as much as the collateral constraint allows. The final good is used for
consumption as well as investment in capital. To render movements in the price of cap-
ital possible, aggregate investment is assumed to be subject to convex adjustment costs.
However, to stay in line with most of the previous literature, the baseline calibration has
a fixed capital stock. This assumption seems to be an acceptable shortcut, since there is
evidence that capital is supplied quite inelastically in the short run. Turning to financial
markets, agents trade in two assets: Physical capital and risk-free debt, which is in zero net
supply. Agents may only borrow if they hold enough capital as collateral. More precisely,
the borrowing limit that each agent faces is proportionate to the current value of his capital
holdings.
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The numerical experiment consists of a one-time shock to total factor productivity (TFP),
which is not anticipated. This is exactly the same as in the previous literature. Because
of the idiosyncratic risk, I have to resort to global solution techniques as opposed to local
methods like log-linearization. As a starting point, I solve for a stationary equilibrium,
where individual variables are stochastic, but aggregates are constant. As markets are
incomplete and capital is held by individual entrepreneurs, the interest rate is not equal
to the marginal product of capital. Therefore, it does not suffice to determine the interest
rate as in Aiyagari (1994), but output has to be computed at the same time.
When the unanticipated shock hits, the economy drops out of the stationary equilibrium,
to which it subsequently converges back. To capture these dynamics, the transition paths
of output, interest rate and price of capital have to be computed simultaneously. In the
scenario where TFP falls by one percent for one period, output and the price of capital are
reduced strongly and persistently. One period after the one-time shock, output is down by
almost two percent and the price of capital by more than seven percent. Four years after
the shock, the price of capital is still depressed by some four percent, and it takes about
eight years until the economy roughly returns to its steady state. In contrast, without fi-
nancing frictions the economy is back at the steady state within one year. Thus, collateral
constraints have a substantial impact on the aggregate economy. I carefully quantify the
mechanism creating this impact. When the shock hits, the wealth of constrained agents
falls by almost 30 percent, which makes them reduce their capital holdings by nearly 25
percent. Consequently, capital is allocated less efficiently, which drags down output both
directly and indirectly through its impact on labor supply.
In contrast to the previous literature, the dynamics are also driven by a change in the
percentage of constrained agents. It goes up by more than 35 percent on impact, and after
four years it is still 10 percent above the steady state level. This feature of the model
implies that the relation between the size of a shock and its impact is far from linear.
For instance, if the size of a negative shock is doubled, the number of constrained agents
increases considerably. Thus, there are now more agents that are strongly affected by the
shock which in addition is twice as severe. Consequently, the impact on the aggregate
economy is much more than twice as large. This demonstrates that modeling idiosyncratic
risk can reveal previously unexplored implications of collateral constraints.
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In a series of papers, Moll (2010), Buera and Shin (2010), and Buera and Moll (2011)
also analyze models where entrepreneurs are subject to productivity risk and collateral
constraints. Following Angeletos (2007), they assume that entrepreneurs face constant
returns to scale. As a consequence, each individual entrepreneur is either constrained or
does not produce at all, depending only on his productivity. Thus, all agents that engage
in collateralized borrowing are constrained—as in models with heterogeneous patience.
While this is a drawback for quantitative analysis, it implies that individual decisions
nicely aggregate, which makes strong theoretical results possible. One such result of Buera
and Moll (2011) is that models with heterogeneous patience correspond to representative
agents models which mainly feature investment wedges. Interestingly, Chari, Kehoe, and
McGratten (2007) show that such investment wedges do not account for a large part of the
aggregate fluctuations found in US data, but efficiency wedges do. This gives additional
support to my paper, which generates and carefully measures endogenous movements in
efficiency that are caused by collateral constraints.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model and derives
some analytic results. Section 2.3 explains the numerical approach, describes the calibra-
tion, studies the steady state, analyzes the response to the shock, and finally carries out a
sensitivity analysis. Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 Model
Time is discrete and infinite. The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived
agents with homogeneous preferences and heterogeneous skills. While there is no aggregate
risk, skills are subject to idiosyncratic risk. Depending on their skills, some agents are
workers while others are entrepreneurs. The latter use capital to produce intermediate
goods, which are then combined with labor to produce the final output good. This good is
used for consumption as well as investment in capital, which is subject to convex adjustment
costs. Financial markets are incomplete: agents trade in capital and debt subject to
collateral constraints. The details are as follows.
2.2.1 Preferences and Skills
Agents have homogeneous preferences: the discount factor, β, the risk aversion parameter,
γ, and the elasticity of labor supply, 1/θ, are all equal across agents. Each agent i ∈ [0, 1]
maximizes expected lifetime utility given by
E
[
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1− γ
((
ci,t −
hi,t
1+θ
1 + θ
)1−γ
− 1
)]
,
where ci,t and hi,t are consumption and hours worked of agent i at time t. Preferences
are assumed to be of the above GHH type, because this excludes any wealth effect on
the choice of hours worked (see Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988)). As a con-
sequence, aggregate labor supply does not depend on the distribution of wealth among
agents (see Lemma 2.1).
Agents differ with respect to their labor productivity, awi,t ∈ A
w, as well as their en-
trepreneurial productivity, aei,t ∈ A
e. Agent’s types, si,t =
(
awi,t, a
e
i,t
)
∈ S, follow Markov
processes that are independent and identically distributed across agents.1 Their transi-
tion probabilities are denoted by M(si,t+1, si,t). The distribution over types is assumed to
be stationary, and the respective measure over types is denoted by µ. At time t agent i
1As pointed out by Judd (1985), a continuum of independent random variables causes problems for
Lebesgue integration. Therefore, I follow Uhlig (1996) and use the L2-Riemann integral when integrating
over a continuum of agents who face idiosyncratic risk.
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supplies awi,thi,t units of labor to the market. If a
e
i,t > 0, then agent i also runs a business
as explained below. Therefore, he is called an entrepreneur. All other agents are called
worker.
2.2.2 Production
Each entrepreneur may invest to produce a differentiated intermediate good. The amount
produced,
yi,t = f(a
e
i,t−1, a
e
i,t)ki,t,
is linear in the capital invested, ki,t, which is chosen in period t− 1. Through the function
f , production also depends on the entrepreneurial productivity in the period of investment
as well as the period of production. I assume that f (0, ·) = 0, i.e. workers, which have
aei,t−1 = 0, do not have an investment opportunity in t− 1.
Final output, Yt, is produced competitively from intermediate goods and labor
2:
Yt = At
(∫
yφi,tdi
)α/φ
L1−αt ,
where At is total factor productivity (TFP) and Lt is aggregate labor given by
Lt =
∫
awi,thi,tdi.
The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in final good production is 1/(1−
φ). I assume 0 < φ < 1, i.e. intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes. Final output is
used for consumption and investment:
Yt = Ct + It.
Apart from labor, capital is the only productive factor in this model. This is in contrast
to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kocherlakota (2000) who make the stark distinction
2Labor enters final good production rather than intermediate goods production, because this en-
sures that the labor share in aggregate output does not depend on the distribution of capital among
entrepreneurs. This property is needed to establish Lemma 2.1.
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between non-depreciating land and fully depreciating capital. Omitting this distinction
but assuming non-trivial depreciation, the model is closer to standard quantitative macro
models. However, for the collateral constraint mechanism to work, the price of collateral,
i.e. of capital, has to fall in bad times. The most standard assumption that generates this
reaction is convex adjustment costs as in Hayashi (1982). In particular, I assume quadratic
costs as in Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007). There is a competitive capital production sector
which produces Kt+1 units of new capital from combining Kt units of old capital with an
amount of investment given by3
It(Kt, Kt+1) = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +
ξ
2
(Kt+1 −Kt)
2
Kt
,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is depreciation and ξ ∈ [0,+∞] parameterizes adjustment costs.4 This
specification includes two important special cases: For ξ = 0, standard neoclassical capital
accumulation; for ξ = +∞, a fixed capital stock.
2.2.3 Markets
The consumption good is traded at the normalized price of one. The price of the interme-
diate good produced by agent i at time t is denoted by pii,t. The price of old capital, kt,
sold to the capital production sector at t is pt, the price charged for new capital, kt+1, is
qt. Agents may take up debt, di,t+1, in which case they have to repay di,t+1Rt+1 at t + 1.
Thus, the budget constraint (BC) faced by each agent is given by:
BC: ct + qtkt+1 − dt+1 ≤ pitktf(a
e
t−1, a
e
t ) + ptkt − dtRt + wthta
w
t .
3Alternatively, one could make the adjustment costs proportional to (Kt+1 −Kt(1− δ))
2
rather than
(Kt+1 −Kt)
2
. While both specifications are intuitive, the latter is technically more convenient. First, it
makes the steady state independent of the parameter ξ. Second, the extreme case of ξ = +∞ corresponds
to a fixed capital stock, rather than a capital stock that decays by the rate of depreciation.
4In Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007) each individual entrepreneur faces an adjustment costs function as
specified above. They also assume that old capital may be traded among entrepreneurs before investments
are made. With this assumption, all entrepreneurs choose the same ratio of old capital to new capital
and thus face the same shadow cost of new capital. For this reason, the specification in Lorenzoni and
Walentin (2007) is equivalent to my assumption, i.e. a competitive capital production sector which buys
all old capital and sells new capital. I choose to assume convex adjustment costs at the aggregate level,
because empirical studies show that convex adjustment costs are consistent with aggregate investment
date, but not with firm level-data (see Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007)).
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Debt is in zero net supply,
Dt+1 =
∫
di,t+1di = 0,
i.e. some agents hold negative debt, thus lending money to other agents. However, lenders
cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless these debts are secured by collateral
assets. Therefore, they impose a collateral constraint on borrowers. More precisely, the
repayment obligation of a borrower may not exceed a fraction κ ∈ [0, 1] of next period’s
value of the capital acquired today:
dt+1Rt+1 ≤ κpt+1kt+1.
This collateral constraint might for example follow from the fact that liquidation of the
collateralized assets is inefficient, i.e. in case of default lenders can recover only a frac-
tion κ of the collateral value. Knowing this, borrowers can renegotiate and reduce the
repayment obligation, if it is higher than the liquidation value. Thus, the lender does not
lend more than this value in the first place. Alternatively, the collateral constraint might
arise because the entrepreneur is able to divert a fraction (1 − κ) of the capital invested.
Anticipating this, lenders will not allow borrowers to take up a repayment obligation that
exceeds the value of the non-divertible part of capital.
As an alternative to the above collateral constraint, I also consider the following modifica-
tion:
CC: dt+1Rt+1 ≤ κptkt+1.
Here, lenders (or regulators) use the current price, pt, to assess the collateral value and set
the borrowing limit accordingly. In what follows, I concentrate on this specification, but
consider the first one in Section 2.3.5 as a robustness analysis.
Finally, agents face a short-sale constraint (SC) on capital:
SC: 0 ≤ kt+1.
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2.2.4 Equilibrium
I now define equilibrium for the economy described above. In this definition, agents’
policies do not depend on i, but only on time t and individual characteristics, xt ≡
(dt, kt, a
w
t , a
e
t , a
e
t−1). This is exactly the kind of equilibrium I compute in Section 2.3. Con-
sequently, the quantities (ct, dt+1, ht, kt+1, yt, and pit) in the below definition are functions
that map the state of an agent, xt, into a real number. In contrast, prices (pt, qt, Rt+1 and
wt) are just real numbers. The distribution over individual characteristics is denoted by
Φt. Recall that there is no aggregate risk, i.e. expectations are over idiosyncratic shocks
only.
Definition 2.1. (Competitive Equilibrium)
A competitive equilibrium of the economy 〈β, γ, θ, S,M, f, {At}, α, φ, δ, ξ, κ,Φ0〉 is a se-
quence of quantities, prices and distributions5
{ct, dt+1, ht, kt+1, yt, Yt, pt, qt, Rt+1, wt, pit,Φt}t∈N
such that:
• Given prices {pt, qt, Rt+1, wt, pit}t∈N,
agents choose quantities {ct, dt+1, ht, kt+1}t∈N to maximize
E
[
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1− γ
((
ct −
ht
1+θ
1 + θ
)1−γ
− 1
)]
,
subject to BC, CC, and SC.
• For all t ∈ N, given prices (pit, wt), the final output firm chooses inputs (yt, Lt) to
maximize profits
At
(∫
yt(x)
φdΦt(x)
)α/φ
L1−αt −
∫
pit(x)yt(x)dΦt(x)− wtLt.
• For all t ∈ N, given prices (qt, pt), the capital production firm chooses inputs (It, Kt)
5To streamline the exposition, I omit to state requirements on the measurability of the policy functions.
Note also that I use the definition N = {0, 1, . . . }.
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to maximize profits
qtKt+1(It, Kt)− It − ptKt,
where Kt+1(It, Kt) is given by It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +
ξ
2
(Kt+1−Kt)
2
Kt
.
• For all t ∈ N, all markets clear6:
Lt =
∫
awt (x)ht(x)dΦt(x), Yt = Ct + It,
Kt =
∫
kt(x)dΦt(x), Kt+1 =
∫
kt+1(x)dΦt(x), 0 =
∫
dt+1(x)dΦt(x),
∀s : yt(x) = f(a
e
t−1(x), a
e
t (x))kt(x).
• For all t ∈ N, Φt+1 is generated from Φt by the exogenous Markov processes for skills
and from individual policies dt+1, kt+1.
In Section 2.3, I will numerically solve for competitive equilibria. To facilitate the com-
putations, some analytical results have to be established. First of all, I make use of GHH
preferences to derive labor supply and the wage as functions of aggregate output only. For
this purpose, I assume that the distribution of labor productivity satisfies the following
normalization:7
∫
(awi,t)
1+1/θdi = 1.
Lemma 2.1. (Wage and Labor Supply)
Labor supply and the wage satisfy: Lt = ((1− α)Yt)
1
1+θ , wt = ((1− α)Yt)
θ
1+θ .
Proof. From the FOCs with respect to ht and ct:
uh(ct, ht) + uc(ct, ht)wa
w
t = 0 ⇔
(
ct −
h1+θt
1+θ
)−γ
(hθt − wa
w
t ) = 0 ⇔ ht = (wa
w
t )
1/θ. Conse-
6Note that Kt+1 denotes new capital in period t and also old capital in period t+ 1. Hence, it has to
satisfy the two respective market clearing conditions. Note also that I use Walras’ Law to omit the market
clearing condition for the consumption good.
7This normalization ensures that aggregate labor supply is as in an economy where all agents have
homogeneous labor productivity of one (see proof to Lemma 2.1).
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quently, aggregate efficiency units of labor are
Lt =
∫
awi,t(wta
w
i,t)
1/θdi = w
1/θ
t
∫
(awi,t)
1+1/θdi = w
1/θ
t ,
where the final step employs the normalization from above. Using this and the FOC for
final good production, i.e. wt = (1− α)YtL
−1
t , the above results follow.
Lemma 2.2. (Price of Intermediate Goods)
The price of intermediate goods y(xt) is given by: pi(xt) = Zyt(xt)
φ−1 ,
where Z ≡ α (1− α)
(1−α)φ
α(1+θ) Aφ/αY
α−φ
α
+
(1−α)φ
α(1+θ) .
Proof. The first order condition of the final output firm with respect to input from firms
with characteristics xt provides:
pi(xt) =
αAL1−α
φ
(∫
yt(x)
φdΦt(x)
)α
φ
−1
φyt(xt)
φ−1
= αAφ/αY
α−φ
α L
(1−α)φ
α yt(xt)
φ−1
= α (1− α)
(1−α)φ
α(1+θ) Aφ/αY
α−φ
α
+
(1−α)φ
α(1+θ) yt(xt)
φ−1
= Zyt(xt)
φ−1,
where Lemma 2.1 and the definition of Z are used.
Lemma 2.3. (Price of Capital)
The prices of old and new capital are given by:
pt = (1− δ) +
ξ
2
((
Kt+1
Kt
)2
− 1
)
, qt = 1 + ξ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− 1
)
.
Proof. These prices follow from differentiating
It(Kt+1, Kt) = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +
ξ
2
(Kt+1 −Kt)
2
Kt
.
The price of old capital is given by the marginal reduction in investment due to a marginal
increase of old capital, while the price of new capital is given by the marginal increase in
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investment needed to produce an additional marginal unit of new capital:
pt = −
(
∂It
∂Kt
)
, qt =
∂It
∂Kt+1
.
In Section 2.3, I consider the case of a fixed capital stock. To make this assumption a
special case of the economy with convex adjustment costs, the limit for ξ going to infinity
has to be considered. Being slightly imprecise, I refer to this limit as ξ = +∞. In this
situation, the prices of old and new capital differ exactly by δ.
Lemma 2.4. (Price of Fixed Capital)
As ξ goes to infinity, the prices of old and new capital satisfy:
pt = qt − δ.
Proof. First use Lemma 2.3, then simplify, and finally take the limit:
pt = (1− δ) +
ξ
2
((
qt − 1
ξ
+ 1
)2
− 1
)
= qt − δ +
(qt − 1)
2
ξ
,
lim
ξ→+∞
pt = qt − δ + lim
ξ→+∞
(qt − 1)
2
ξ
= qt − δ.
Lemma 2.5. (FOCs to Individual Problem)
The FOCs to the individual optimization problem are for all t ∈ N:
BC: 0 = pitktf(a
e
t−1, a
e
t ) + ptkt − dtRt + wthta
w
t − ct − qtkt+1 + dt+1
SC: 0 ≤ kt+1 ∧ 0 ≤ νt ∧ 0 = kt+1νt
CC: 0 ≤ κptkt+1 − dt+1Rt+t ∧ 0 ≤ µt ∧ 0 = (κptkt+1 − dt+1Rt+1)µt
kt+1: 0 = −uc(ct, ht)qt + νt + µtκpt + βE
[
uc(ct+1, ht+1)
(
Zfφkφ−1t+1 + pt+1
)]
dt+1: 0 = −uc(ct, ht) + µtRt+1 + βRt+1E [uc(ct+1, ht+1)]
ht: 0 = uh(ct, ht) + uc(ct, ht)wa
w
t
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Proof. Follows from differentiating the Lagrangian to the individual optimization problem
and substituting the consumption Euler equation into the other equations. For the capital
Euler equation, Lemma 2.2 is used.
For the computational exercises presented later, the natural starting point is a stationary
equilibrium, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. (Stationary Competitive Equilibrium)
A stationary competitive equilibrium of the economy 〈β, γ, θ, S,M, f, {At}, α, φ, δ, ξ, κ,Φ0〉
is s a competitive equilibrium
{ct, dt+1, ht, kt+1, yt, Yt, pt, qt, Rt+1, wt, pit,Φt}t∈N
with all components being constant over time.
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2.3 Results
This section presents a quantitative analysis of the model described above. The main
exercise is a one-time unanticipated shock to aggregate TFP as in the previous literature
on collateral constraints. Thus, the economy starts from a steady state, i.e. a stationary
competitive equilibrium as in Definition 2.2. Then TFP drops for one period, which is not
anticipated. Starting from that period, the economy is on a transition path back to the
steady state. Along the transition path the economy is in a non-stationary competitive
equilibrium as in Definition 2.1. In this section, I first describe the numerical procedures
used to compute the steady state and the transition path. Then I present the baseline
calibration of the model. A brief description of the steady state precedes a thorough study
of the impact generated by a shock. Finally, I check how robust the results are to changes
in crucial parameters.
2.3.1 Numerical Solution
The numerical procedure used to solve for the steady state builds on the pioneering work of
Aiyagari (1994). With a neoclassical production function and exogenous labor supply, the
only aggregate variable that Aiyagari (1994) has to determine numerically is the interest
rate—because output, capital stock and the wage are all determined by the interest rate
through the firm’s FOCs. This is different in my model, where the distribution of capital
among entrepreneurs matters for output. Consequently, I have to compute both the interest
rate and output, which is done by Algorithm 1.8 As this algorithm solves for a stationary
equilibrium, there are no time-indexes in its description.
8To understand why Algorithm 1 iterates over the interest rate and output, consider its second step.
In this step individual policy functions have to be computed given aggregate variables. From the FOCs to
the individual problem (see Lemma 2.5) it is clear that the endogenous aggregate variables that influence
individual choice are: Y, p, q, R, and w. By Lemma 2.1, w follows from Y . From Lemma 2.3, it is obvious
that the steady state prices of capital are simply: pt = 1− δ, qt = 1. Hence, it indeed suffices to guess R
and Y in order to compute individual policies.
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Algorithm 1. (Solve for Steady State)
1. Guess aggregate variables {R, Y }.
2. Given {R, Y }, solve for individual policy functions {d, k}.
3. Given {R, Y } and {d, k}, find the stationary distribution Φ.
4. From {d, k} and Φ, calculate the implied {Dˆ, Yˆ }.
5. Using {Dˆ, Yˆ }, update the guess for {R, Y } and go back to step 2.
Concerning the implementation of Algorithm 1, a few remarks are in place. Step 2 is carried
out by iterating on policy functions. To reduce the number of continuous dimensions to
the individual problem, I define financial wealth:
ωt ≡ pitktf(a
e
t−1, a
e
t ) + ptkt − dtRt.
To interpolate policy functions along this dimension, I use piece-wise linear interpolation.
The grid of interpolation nodes is finer at lower levels of financial wealth and it is au-
tomatically refined near the kink induced by the collateral constraint (see Brumm and
Grill (2010)). To find the invariant distribution in step 3, I discretize the transition (be-
tween individual states (ω, aw, ae)), which is implied by {d, k}. For this purpose, I use a
transition grid that is ten times finer than the interpolation grid, which results in a large
transition matrix. Using standard numerical procedures, it is nevertheless possible to find
its non-negative eigenvector with eigenvalue one. If the transition grid is fine enough, this
eigenvector provides a good approximation to the true invariant distribution over individ-
ual states (which is continuous). In step 4, the policies from step 2 are evaluated over the
distribution from step 3 to get the implied level of output and net aggregate debt. Finally,
step 4 employs a linear regression approach to update the guesses, which is explained in
Appendix 2.A.
When it comes to the transition path, the computational burden increases substantially
for two reasons: First, as aggregate variables change along the transition path, sequences
rather than steady state levels of aggregate variables have to be computed. Second, in
addition to output and the interest rate, one additional aggregate variable has to be de-
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termined numerically, as the prices of capital are no longer determined by steady state
conditions. I choose to guess the price of new capital, which implies the price of old capital
and the evolution of the aggregate capital stock through Lemma 2.3. Accordingly, the
transition path is computed as in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2. (Solve for Transition Path)
1. Choose a time horizon T and guess the transition path {Rt, Yt, qt}t∈{0,...,T}
2. Given {Rt, Yt, qt}t∈{0,...,T},
solve backwards for individual policy functions {dt+1, kt+1}t∈{0,...,T}.
3. Given {Rt, Yt, qt}t∈{0,...,T} and {dt+1, kt+1}t∈{0,...,T},
solve forwards for the distributions {Φt}t∈{0,...,T}.
4. From {dt+1, kt+1}t∈{0,...,T} and {Φt}t∈{0,...,T},
calculate the implied {Dˆt, Yˆt, Kˆt}t∈{1,...,T}.
5. Using {Dˆt, Yˆt, Kˆt}t∈{1,...,T},
update the guess for {Rt, Yt, qt}t∈{0,...,T} and go back to step 2.
Concerning step 1, T has to be chosen such that the economy indeed converges to the
steady state within T years (up to the desired numerical precision). If this is not the case,
T has to be increased. For steps 2, 3 and 4, the procedures used are similar to the ones
used in Algorithm 1. It is step 5, that causes most problems. The guess for each of the
T ×3 variables (e.g. qt) influences not only the implied value for the corresponding variable
(e.g. Kˆt), but also other concurrent variables (e.g Dˆt), future variables (e.g Yˆt+1), and past
variables (e.g qˆt−1). Because of this, it is difficult to update the T ×3 guesses in a way that
makes Algorithm 2 converge. The procedure I use to achieve this is explained in Appendix
2.A.
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preferences:
discount factor β .96
coefficient of risk aversion γ 2
Frisch elasticity 1/θ 3
skills:
productivity types
sl (0.91, 0)
sh (1.06, 0)
se (1.06, 2.48)
transition matrix M

.756 .233 .011.233 .756 .011
.050 .050 .900


production:
capital share α .36
elasticity of substitution
1/(1− φ) 4
between intermediate goods
depreciation δ .08
capital adjustment costs ξ +∞
capital markets:
collateralizability of capital κ .86
Table 2.1: Baseline Calibration
2.3.2 Calibration
I calibrate the model to annual U.S. data.9 The parameters of the model, which are re-
ported in Table 2.1, fall into four classes, relating to preferences, skills, production, and
capital markets. Concerning preferences, I pick parameter values that are standard in the
literature. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.96, which matches a real interest rate of
2.0%.10 The parameter γ is set equal to 2, which is a moderate level of risk aversion.
Finally, θ is taken to be 1/3, which implies a comparatively high Frisch elasticity of 3, as
in Prescott (2004). A high Frisch elasticity is helpful to generate a realistic co-movement
of labor and output without assuming frictions in the labor market. It turns out that the
high Frisch elasticity reinforces propagation generated by credit constraints (see Sections
9One important reason for choosing the period length to be one year rather than three months is as
follows. The length of a period fixes the duration of debt contracts, which clearly plays a role in models
with collateral constraints. A duration of one year is a much better approximation to the actual maturity
structure of corporate debt than a duration of one quarter—Barclay and Smith (1995) report that more
than 70% of outstanding corporate debt is due in more than one year.
10As debt is risk-free in this model, the model interest rate should be close to the actual risk-free rate.
On the other hand, debt is the only investment opportunity for non-entrepreneurs in this economy, which
speaks in favor of setting it equal to the (weighted) average of the return on risk-free and risky investments.
To strike a compromise between these two lines of reasoning, I choose 2.0%, which is in between the return
on risk-free and risky investments, but closer to the risk-free rate.
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2.3.4 and 2.3.5), while it does not generate propagation on its own (see Appendix 2.B).
With regard to skills, I assume that the Markov process for labor productivity and en-
trepreneurial productivity, s = (aw, ae), has a support of three states only:
sl = (awl , 0), s
h = (awh , 0), s
e = (awh , a
e
h).
Agents with these skill levels are called: low skilled workers, high skilled workers and
entrepreneurs.11 The two levels for labor productivity, awl and a
w
h , are determined by
a two-state approximation to the first-order autoregression of (log of) individual labor
income reported in Heaton and Lucas (1996).12 Concerning entrepreneurs, I assume that
they make up 10% of the population and that the yearly exit rate from the state of being
an entrepreneur is 10%. These choices are compromises between the respective values
used by Quadrini (2000) and Boha´cek (2006).13 If an entrepreneur becomes a worker,
the chances of being low skilled or high skilled are equal. Likewise, the probability of
becoming an entrepreneur is the same for both types of workers. Combined, all these
properties uniquely determine the transition matrix between individual states, M , which
is given in Table 2.1.
Concerning intermediate good production, I assume
f(aei,t−1, a
e
i,t) = a
e
i,t1{aei,t−1>0} , i.e. yi,t =

a
e
i,tki,t for a
e
i,t−1 > 0
0 for aei,t−1 = 0 .
11The assumption that entrepreneurs have high labor productivity is innocuous. Assuming low labor
productivity for entrepreneurs does not change the results to any significant amount.
12Consider a discrete Markov chain for the log of labor income with states {−,+} and transition
probabilities P (|) = P (−| − ). I want this process to match the variance and autocovariance of the
autoregressive process from Heaton and Lucas (1996), which has persistence ρ = 0.529 and an error
term with standard deviation σ = 0.251. Thus, the discrete Markov chain has to satisfy, 2 = σ2/(1 −
ρ2), and ρσ2/(1 − ρ2) = (2P (|) − 1)2, which implies  =
√
σ2/(1− ρ2) and P (|) = (1 + ρ)/2. The
states {−,+} are normalized values for the log of labor income (normalized such that the two states
sum up to zero). To find the corresponding values for labor productivity, (awh , a
w
l ), I use that individual
labor income is given by whta
w
t = (wa
w
t )
1+1/θ (see proof of Lemma 2.1). Consequently, (awh , a
w
l ) have to
satisfy: (awh )
1+1/θ/(awl )
1+1/θ = e+/e−. Combining this condition with the normalizing assumption about
the distribution of aw from Section 2.2, which now reads (awh )
1+1/θ/2 + (awl )
1+1/θ/2 = 1, the parameters
(awh , a
w
l ) are pinned down.
13In Quadrini (2000) the percentage of entrepreneurs is 12% and the yearly exit rate 18%. In Boha´cek
(2006) the percentage of entrepreneurs is 9% and the yearly exit rate 4.5%.
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Similar to Quadrini (2000), this entrepreneurial production function implies a high cor-
relation between output and investment opportunities, e.g. aet = 0 implies that current
output is zero and that there are also no entrepreneurial investment opportunities. As a
normalization, I set aeh = M(s
e|se)−1/φµ(se)(φ−1)/φ. This ensures that in the complete mar-
kets benchmark aggregate output is as in an economy where all agents are entrepreneurs
with entrepreneurial productivity equal to one, and the production function collapses to
Yt = AtKtLt (see Appendix 2.B).
Concerning aggregate TFP and depreciation, I set A = 1 and δ = 0.08, which matches
a capital-to-output ratio of 3.0. I assume that the capital share, α, equals 0.36, as in
Aiyagari (1994). The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is set equal to
4 (i.e. φ = .75), which is well within the range of estimates from the trade and industrial
organization literature (see Hsieh and Klenow (2009)).
Concerning adjustment costs, I make an extreme assumption for the baseline calibration,
namely ξ = +∞. This results in a fixed capital stock, as assumed in Cordoba and Ripoll
(2004), Mendicino (2008) and also the basic model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (where
the fixed input is called land). Thus, choosing ξ = +∞ makes my results comparable to
many papers from the literature on collateral constraints. Additionally, from an empirical
perspective, one could argue that capital is supplied almost inelastically in the short-run.
The reason is that it takes on average much more than one year from the decision to invest
until the completion of the investment (see Kydland and Prescott (1982)). Given that
modeling this time-to-build lag is computationally burdensome, assuming infinite adjust-
ment costs seems to be an acceptable shortcut for the question considered. In Section 2.3.5,
I analyze the sensitivity of the results with respect to the adjustment cost parameter.
The only parameter of the model that relates to capital markets is κ. I follow Mendicino
(2008) and set κ = 0.86. This parameter value is based on a measure of the efficiency of
debt enforcement in the US which is constructed by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer
(2008).
2.3.3 Steady State
Before turning to the dynamics induced by a shock, I briefly describe the steady state.
While individual variables move in the steady state, their distribution does not vary. Figure
2.1 plots the distribution over financial wealth for each type of agent, and also for the total
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population.14 High skilled workers are just a little richer than low skilled, but entrepreneurs
are much richer than workers: The average entrepreneur has financial wealth 26.7, while
the average worker has only 6.7. There are two important reasons for this large gap in
wealth. First, entrepreneurs make business profits on top of labor earnings. Second, they
have a stronger incentive to save, because they have high-return investment opportunities.
To make use of these, they take up debt but also have to inject their own wealth as equity.
This is nicely displayed in Figure 2.2, which plots the policy functions of entrepreneurs.
For levels of financial wealth below 27.4, which applies to 61% of all entrepreneurs, the
collateral contraint is binding. In this situation, debt is proportional to capital:
dt+1 =
κpt
Rt+1
kt+1.
At the point where the collateral constraint ceases to be binding, there are kinks in the
policy functions. From that point onwards, investment in capital moderately increases
further, while the demand for debt soon starts to decrease. The reason is that very rich
entrepreneurs finance a large part of their investments out of their own pockets.
2.3.4 Response to TFP Shock
I now analyze the response of the model economy to an unanticipated shock to aggregate
TFP. The shock occurs in period t = 0. From t = 1 onwards, TFP is assumed to be back
at its steady state level. With a shock like that, output would also return to its steady
state level in period t = 1 already, if financing frictions were absent (see Appendix 2.B).
In contrast, the model with collateral constraints exhibits sizable propagation. This is
displayed in Figure 2.3, which plots the response of key aggregate variables to the one-time
shock in TFP. The variable that exhibits the strongest reaction to the shock is the price of
capital.15 It initially drops by 8%, and it is still depressed by about 4% after three years.
The interest rate reacts only slightly in period zero, but it is moderately above the steady
14Note that the scales of all plots are the same and that they do not entirely cover all four densities.
Concerning entrepreneurs, the richest 1% have financial wealth above 100, but below 150. When it comes
to workers, the density near zero is above 0.06, in fact reaching levels about 0.1.
15I choose to plot the price of new capital, qt, rather than pt. Lemma 2.4 shows that pt = qt − δ, if the
capital stock is fixed.
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Figure 2.3: Response of Output and Prices
state level as the economy recovers.16 Most importantly, the drop in output is sizable and
persistent. It takes about eight years until the economy is roughly back at the steady state.
In what follows, I analyze why there is so much persistence in this economy.
In a model with collateral constraints, output depends not only on the amount of labor
and capital in the economy, but also on the allocation of capital among entrepreneurs.
Poor entrepreneurs operate at a less than efficient scale, because they get less than optimal
financing. To quantify how (in-)efficient capital is allocated among entrepreneurs, define
capital efficiency,
Et ≡
1
Kt
(∫
yφi,tdi
)1/φ
,
and observe how Et enters aggregate output:
Yt = AtE
α
t K
α
t L
1−α
t .
16This is in line with King and Watson (1996), who report that the correlation between the real interest
rate and output is small but positive.
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Figure 2.4: Decomposing the Reaction of Output
With X˜ denoting the log-deviation of the variable X from its steady state value, the output
response may be decomposed as follows:
Y˜t = A˜t + αE˜t + αK˜t + (1− α)L˜t.
Remember that capital is fixed in the baseline calibration, thus K˜t = 0 throughout. Note
also that E˜0 = 0, because the allocation of capital is determined one period ahead. Con-
sequently, the initial drop in output is due only to the drop in TFP and the associated
reaction in labor supply. This drop would be of the same magnitude without financial
frictions. However, from period t = 1 onwards, output is diminished for a quite different
reason, as can be seen from Figure 2.4. In period t = 1, TFP has already recovered, but
capital efficiency is now down by 2.5%. The direct effect of this is a reduction in output
of about 2.5% × α = 0.9%. On top of that, a lower capital efficiency implies a reduced
marginal product of labor, which drags down labor supply by 1.4% resulting in an addi-
tional drop in output of 1.4% × (1− α) = 0.9%. Summing up, a one-time negative shock
to TFP causes a persistent drop in capital efficiency which in turn depresses labor and
output for several years.
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The drop in capital efficiency is caused by the collateral constraints. The basic mecha-
nism at work is illustrated in Figure 2.5, which is similar to Figure 1 in Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). The key role is played by the constrained entrepreneurs, who have low
financial wealth, are highly leveraged, and operate at high marginal returns. In contrast
to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) the aggregate shock does not only reduce the wealth of con-
strained agents but also increases their number. Consider the intratemporal effects first.
In period t = 0, TFP is low, which implies low returns on entrepreneurial investment.
However, the repayment obligations that entrepreneurs face remain unaffected. Thus, the
financial wealth of highly leveraged agents is reduced sharply. For agents who are col-
lateral constrained—and their number is rising due to the shock—lower financial wealth
necessitates lower investment in capital. In the aggregate, the reduced capital demand
from the constrained entrepreneurs has to be offset by increased capital demand from rich
entrepreneurs. However, to make them invest in spite of their low marginal returns, the
price of capital has to fall. But a falling price of capital further reduces the financial wealth
of constrained entrepreneurs, which constitutes a powerful intratemporal feedback effect.
Now consider the intertemporal effects. First of all, as constrained entrepreneurs have to
forgo profitable investment opportunities in t = 0, they have less financial wealth in t = 1,
which lowers the demand for capital and its price in that period. A lower price in t = 1
reduces the payoff to investments made in t = 0, thus depressing the price in t = 0 further.
In principle, these intertemporal effects are effective up until t =∞.
The quantitative significance of the collateral constraint mechanism is documented in Fig-
ure 2.6. It shows the response of constrained agents’ financial wealth and capital demand.
In period t = 0 their financial wealth falls by 28%, which causes a reduction of their cap-
ital holding by 23%. The reduced demand in turn causes the price of capital to drop by
8%, which accounts for most of the total loss in financial wealth of constrained agents.
Thus, the intratemporal feedback effect described above has quantitative bite. That the
combined impact of the intratemporal and the intertemporal effects is substantial can be
inferred from the fact that all three plotted variables remain depressed for several years.
This is not least because the number of constrained agents goes up as the shock hits. Fig-
ure 2.7 plots the response of the percentage of constrained agents; it rises by some 36%
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Figure 2.6: Quantifying the Collateral Constraint Mechanism
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Figure 2.7: Percentage of Constrained Entrepreneurs
and takes several years to return to its steady state level. This constitutes an extensive
margin to the collateral constraint mechanism which is neither present in Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), nor in any of the papers that quantify their mechanism.17
The feature that the number of constrained agents reacts to shocks has an interesting
implication: The size of the response to a shock is a markedly non-linear function of its
magnitude.18 In particular, a negative shock drags down the economy by more than a
positive shock of the same magnitude boosts the economy. This may help explain why
recessions tend to be sharper than booms, as econometric studies like Hamilton (1989)
find. To quantify the non-linearity, I define two measures for the response in output.
As collateral constraints have no impact on the reaction of output in t = 0, I follow
17To the best of my knowledge, in none of the papers that quantify Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) does
the percentage of constrained agents change non-trivially as the economy is hit by a shock.
18Kocherlakota (2000) presents a knife-edge example of this non-linearity. In the steady state of his
model, the collateral constraints of all agents are just binding. As a consequence, all agents are constrained
and there is positive amplification in case of a bad shock. In contrast, nobody is constrained in case of
a good shock and there is no amplification. By including more heterogeneity among agents and using
non-linear solution techniques, I go beyond this artificial case.
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size of TFP shock Amplification Persistence Constrained
entrepreneurs
in t = 1
∆ ≡
(
A0 − A¯
)
/A¯
((
Y1 − Y¯
)
/Y¯
)
/∆
∑
5
i=1(Yi−Y¯ )
5(Y1−Y¯ )
+1.0% 1.08 0.42 43%
+0.5% 1.14 0.43 50%
−0.5% 1.42 0.46 69%
−1.0% 1.74 0.47 80%
Table 2.2: Impact of Differently Sized Shocks
Kocherlakota (2000) and measure amplification as the deviation of output in t = 1 relative
to the shock in t = 0, i.e. amplification is defined as
((
Y1 − Y¯
)
/Y¯
)
/∆, where ∆ ≡
(
A0 − A¯
)
/A¯.
If measured like that, amplification is zero in the complete markets benchmark. Thus, any
positive value signifies an impact of collateral constraints. To measure the persistence of
the impact on output, I divide the average impact over five years by the impact in year
t = 1, i.e. persistence is defined as
1
5
∑5
i=1
(
Yi − Y¯
)(
Y1 − Y¯
) .
Table 2.2 reports both amplification and persistence for differently sized shocks. These
measures would be equal across shocks, if the response was a linear function of the im-
pulse. This is clearly not the case. For instance, there is 61% more amplification in case of
a −1% shock as opposed to a +1% shock. The last column in Table 2.2 reports the per-
centage of agents that are constrained right after the respective shock hits. The variation
from 43% to 80% suggests that the percentage of constrained agents is indeed the driving
force for the non-linearity in the relation between impulse and response.
While a changing number of constrained agents is a nice feature of this model, it cannot
entirely explain why there is more propagation than in previous quantitative studies on
collateral constraints, like Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) or Mendicino (2008). Such models
assume that there are two types of entrepreneurs, impatient ones which are collateral
constrained, and patient ones which lend money to the impatient. By assuming strongly
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heterogeneous preferences—e.g. yearly discount rates of 0.96 versus 0.66—these papers
can generate huge differences in marginal productivities between entrepreneurs. Within
this context, reallocation of capital can have large effects on output. However, these
models do not create enough reallocation of capital in the first place, and to the extent
that they do, reallocation is only short-lived. The reason is as follows. As the shock
reduces borrowers’ financial wealth, their demand for debt falls dramatically, because two
potential counteracting effects are shut down almost by assumption. First, borrowing could
be increased by reducing any slackness in the collateral constraint. This is not possible
as all borrowers are already constrained before the shock hits. Second, borrowing could
be increased by reducing consumption and buying collateral instead. However, being very
impatient, agents are quite unwilling to do that. The resulting reduction in the demand
for debt is not met by a corresponding reduction in its supply, as lenders are patient and
still want to save. Thus, the interest rate falls sharply,19 which mitigates the collateral
constraint mechanism for the following two reasons. First, a lower interest rate loosens
the collateral constraint, implying less capital reallocation. Second, cheap loans help the
wealth of constrained agents to recover quickly, which makes the reallocation of capital
short-lived. In contrast, capital reallocation is large and persistent in my model (see Figure
2.6) as there is no sizable drop in the interest rate. This is because the above rationale for a
sharp drop in the demand for loans does not apply: Borrowers are not impatient relative to
lenders, and not all borrowers are constrained. In fact, constrained entrepreneurs cut back
consumption substantially, while unconstrained entrepreneurs take up additional debt and
invest in capital in order to profit from the expected rise in the price of capital. Therefore,
the interest rate does not fall substantially, and the collateral constraint mechanism is not
mitigated.
2.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
The results in Section 2.3.4 show that collateral constraints can generate large amplification
and persistence. I now analyze how sensitive this finding is to the value of crucial param-
eters, namely to risk aversion, γ, the Frisch elasticity, 1/θ, the adjustment cost parameter,
19See Figure 7 in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) and Figure 2.a in Mendicino (2008). Note that Cordoba
and Ripoll (2004) consider positive shocks, thus their plots show the reverse reactions to the ones described
here.
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Sensitivity w.r.t. Parameter value Amplification Persistence
Risk aversion
γ
2.5 2.00 0.55
2 1.74 0.47
1.5 1.33 0.41
Frisch elasticity
1/θ
3 1.74 0.47
1 0.91 0.37
1/3 0.53 0.32
Adjustment costs
ξ
+∞ 1.74 0.47
100 1.43 0.49
10 0.73 0.55
1 0.31 0.79
0 0.24 0.91
Collateralizability
κ
1 1.27 0.37
0.86 1.74 0.47
0.85 1.79 0.47
Table 2.3: Sensitivity Analysis
ξ, and the collateralizability of capital, κ. I also consider a different specification for the
collateral constraint. Overall, it turns out that such changes have a substantial impact on
the dynamics of the model, but they do not reduce the impact of collateral constraints to
a negligible size. This robustness stands in contrast to models with heterogeneous prefer-
ences, where Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) find that substantial amplification is a knife-edge
result only.
First, consider risk aversion. It turns out that higher risk aversion leads to higher ampli-
fication and persistence. This is in line with Pintus (2011), who shows that the trade-off
between amplification and persistence found by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) does not nec-
essarily arise in models with collateral constraints.
Next, consider different values for the Frisch elasticity. To put them into perspective,
note that in a recent meta analysis of existing evidence Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber
(2011) report a micro estimate of 0.82 and a macro estimate of 2.84. Clearly, a lower Frisch
elasticity reduces amplification and persistence, as labor supply reacts less to changes in
the efficiency of capital allocation. However, even with a Frisch elasticity of 1/3, which
is even lower than most micro estimates, there is still substantial amplification: 0.53%
compared to 0% with complete markets.
When the adjustment cost parameter ξ is reduced, amplification goes down, but persis-
tence goes up. Without adjustment costs, the price of capital does not move at all and the
collateral constraint mechanism cannot work. Instead, investment reacts to shocks, which
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changes the capital stock. The impact on output that this change in the capital stock has
is far less pronounced than the one generated by the collateral constraint mechanism in
the case of fixed capital. However, it persists for longer. For intermediate values of ξ both
effects are at work. For ξ = 10, which is close to the ξ = 8.5 assumed by Lorenzoni and
Walentin (2007), amplification is still large but much lower than with fixed capital.
Another crucial parameter of the model is the collateralizability of capital, κ. For κ = 1,
amplification and persistence are lower than for κ = 0.86. This is qualitatively in line with
the results of Mendicino (2008). However, it does not confirm her finding that a value
below one is needed to get any sizable effect of collateral constraints.
Finally, consider the alternative specification for the collateral constraint presented in
Section 2.2.3, which is dt+1Rt+1 ≤ κpt+1kt+1. For this specification amplification and per-
sistence are 1.38 and 0.31 respectively. This is still large but considerably smaller than in
the baseline specification, where pt rather than pt+1 enters. The reason is as follows: As the
shock is entirely non-persistent, the price of capital increases from period t = 0 to t = 1.
Therefore, the collateral constraint is looser, if next period’s price rather than this period’s
price enters. A looser constraint in turn leads to lower amplification and persistence.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have constructed and calibrated a model featuring collateral constraints
and idiosyncratic risk. Within this framework, I analyzed the impact of an unanticipated
one-time shock to TFP under the assumption that aggregate capital is fixed, which is ex-
actly the exercise carried out in many previous papers. The propagation of shocks through
collateral constraints turns out to be larger and also more robust than in models assuming
differences in patience. The reason is that in these papers all borrowers are constrained and
very impatient. This assumption, which is precisely made to make collateral constraints
effective, indeed mitigates their effect through its implausibly strong impact on the interest
rate. Apart from avoiding this problem, the model with idiosyncratic risk exhibits inter-
esting dynamics. For instance, the response to a shock is far from being a linear function
of its magnitude: If the size of a negative shock is doubled, the impact on output is much
more than doubled; also, a negative shock depresses the economy by much more than a
positive shock of the same size boosts it. The main reason for this non-linearity is that the
number of agents who become collateral constrained depends heavily on the size of a shock.
There are many interesting ways to extend the current framework in future research. Con-
cerning agents’ skills, one could introduce a finer discretization and make the choice of
occupation endogenous. When it comes to the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock,
it seems promising to explore assumptions different from convex adjustment costs, e.g. a
time-to-build lag. With respect to financing, allowing for defaultable bonds and costs of
default has the potential to strengthen propagation. However, a word of caution is in place:
Such extensions further increase the computational burden which is already substantial.
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Appendix
2.A Details of Numerical Solution
This Appendix provides details of the numerical solution procedure presented in Section
2.3.1. Specifically, it explains the update steps of both algorithms.
In step 5 of Algorithm 1, I regress the deviations from equilibrium {Yˆ −Y, Dˆ} from the pre-
vious iterations of the algorithm on the respective guesses {Y,R} used in these iterations.
Then I use the coefficients of this regression to choose new guesses. These are determined
such that there would be no deviations from equilibrium, if the relation between guesses
and deviations were linear. Clearly, it is not linear, nevertheless the procedure converges
very fast—it turned out to be much faster than a nested bisection method.
In step 5 of Algorithm 2, the guesses for all T×3 variables that represent the transition path
are updated according to the following principles. First, the new guess is given by the old
guess plus a measure of the error in the old guess. For instance, as a measure of the error
in the interest rate the implied aggregate net supply of debt is used. Second, the size of the
update step is governed by an update-factor which is equal across all T×3 variables (except
that it is scaled up by Y¯ in case of output). Third, the update-factor is itself updated
depending on the speed of convergence. The relevant speed is the one of the variable
which converges fastest. If this speed is very low, then the update-factor is increased. If it
is too high, then the update-factor is reduced in order to avoid oscillating behavior. The
update procedure implied by these three principles is stated below. The index n denotes
iterations of the algorithm, and vn denotes the update-factor. The decreasing function φ
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governs the update of vn.
Rt,n+1 = Rt,n + Dˆt,nvn,
Yt,n+1 = Yt,n +
(
Yˆt,n − Yt,n
)
vnY¯ ,
qt,n+1 = qt,n +
(
Kˆt,n −Kt,n
)
vn,
vn+1 = vn · φ
(
min
t
{
min
{
Dˆt,n
Dˆt,n−1
,
Kˆt,n −Kt,n
Kˆt,n−1 −Kt,n−1
,
Yˆt,n − Yt,n
Yˆt,n−1 − Yt,n−1
}})
,
where Kt,n =


K¯ if ξ = +∞ or t = 0(
qt,n−1
ξ
+ 1
)
Kt−1,n if ξ < +∞ and t > 0.
2.B Complete Markets Benchmark
This Appendix analyzes a complete markets version of the model presented in Section 2.2.
In particular, it verifies the statements made in Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.4 about the relation
between the two model versions.
Suppose that markets are complete. Thus, agents may write (and enforce) contracts that
are contingent on individual entrepreneurial output. As there is no aggregate risk, the
expected marginal return on all assets is equalized in equilibrium. Consequently, all en-
trepreneurs operate at the same expected marginal return. In the baseline calibration with
only one type of entrepreneur, this implies that all agents who are entrepreneurs in t − 1
invest Kt/µ(s
e) units of capital. Among these agents only the ones who still have positive
entrepreneurial productivity in period t are productive. Thus, aggregate output is given
by
Yt = At
(∫
yφi,tdi
)α/φ
L1−αt = At
(
µ(se)M(se|se)(aeh)
φ
(
Kt
µ(se)
)φ)αφ
L1−αt .
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Finally, using the normalization from Section 2.3.2, which is
aeh = M(s
e|se)−1/φµ(se)(φ−1)/φ,
the aggregate production function turns out to be as claimed in Section 2.3.2:
Yt = At
(
µ(se)M(se|se)M(se|se)−1µ(se)(φ−1)
(
Kt
µ(se)
)φ)αφ
L1−αt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t .
Building on this result, it is straightforward to analyze the transition path for the complete
markets economy. Note that TFP and capital (which is assumed to be fixed) are both at
their steady state levels from period t = 1 onwards:
At = A¯,Kt = K¯ ∀t ≥ 1.
Using the aggregate production function just derived, it follows that:
Yt = A¯K¯
αL1−αt ∀t > 1.
In addition, Lemma 2.1 implies:
Lt = ((1− α)Yt)
1
1+θ ∀t.
Combined, these equations imply that ∀t > 1 : Yt = Y¯ , Lt = L¯. Thus, the economy returns
to the steady state right after being hit by the shock, which verifies the claim made in
Section 2.3.4.
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Chapter 3
Collateral Requirements and Asset
Prices
3.1 Introduction
The vast majority of debt, especially if it extends over a long period of time, is guaranteed
by tangible assets called collateral. For example, residential homes serve as collateral for
short- and long-term loans to households, and investors can borrow money to establish a
position in stocks, using these as collateral. The margin requirement dictates how much
collateral one has to hold in order to borrow one dollar. Clearly these margin requirements
will have important implications for the price of collateral. In the recent financial crisis it
was argued that excessively low margin requirements were part of the cause of the crisis.
In this paper, we conduct a quantitative study on the effect of margins requirements on
asset prices.
Many previous papers have formalized the idea that borrowing on collateral might give rise
to cyclical fluctuations in real activity and enhance volatility of prices (see e.g. Geanakoplos
(1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1999)). In these models, it
is possible to have substantial departures of the market price from the corresponding price
under frictionless markets. These results have led researchers to suggest that by managing
leverage (or the amount of collateralized borrowing), a central bank can reduce aggregate
fluctuations (see e.g. Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010) or Geanakoplos (2009)).
However, establishing the quantitative importance of collateral requirements as a source of
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excess volatility has been a challenge in the literature (see Kocherlakota (2000) or Cordoba
and Ripoll (2004)). Moreover, so far, there have been few quantitative studies that take into
account that a household can use several different assets as collateral, and that regulated
margin requirements for loans on one asset might have important effects on the volatility
of other assets in the economy.
In this paper we consider a Lucas (1978) style exchange economy with heterogeneous agents
and collateral constraints. We assume that agents can only take short positions if they hold
an infinitely-lived asset (a Lucas tree) as a long position. This model was first analyzed
by Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and subsequently used by Cao (2010) and Brumm and
Grill (2010). As in Kubler and Schmedders (2003) we assume that agents can default on
a negative bond position at any time without any utility penalties or loss of reputation.
Financial securities are therefore only traded if the promises associated with these securi-
ties are backed by collateral. Our main focus is on an economy with two trees which can
be used as collateral for short-term loans. For the first tree the collateral requirement is
determined endogenously while the collateral requirement for loans on the second tree is
exogenously regulated. We show that the presence of collateral constraints and the en-
dogenous margin requirements for the first tree lead to large excess price-volatility of the
second tree. Changes in the regulated margin requirements for the second tree have large
effects on the volatility of both trees. While tightening margins for loans on the second
tree always decreases the price volatility of the first tree, price volatility of the second tree
might very well increase with this change. In our calibration we allow for the possibility of
disaster states. This leads to very large quantitative effects of collateral requirements and
to realistic equity risk premia.
Margin requirements are a crucial feature of our model. They determine with how much
leverage agents can invest in risky assets. Following Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos
and Zame (2002), we endogenize the margin requirements by introducing a menu of finan-
cial securities. All securities promise the same payoff, but they distinguish themselves by
their respective margin requirement. In equilibrium only some of them are traded, thereby
determining an endogenous margin requirement. This implies, of course, that for many
bonds and many next period’s shocks, the face value of the debt falls below the value of
the collateral. As a result there is default in equilibrium. However, in an extension of the
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model we allow for costly default by introducing a real cost to the lender. We examine the
impact of such default costs on equilibrium trading volume and prices. As an alternative
to endogenous margin requirements, we also consider regulated margin requirements. In
particular, our two-tree economy allows us to compare a tree with endogenous margins to
a tree with regulated margins.1
In our calibration of the model there are two heterogeneous agents with Epstein-Zin utility.
They have identical elasticities of substitution (IES) but distinguish themselves by their
risk-aversion (RA). The agent with the low risk aversion is the natural buyer of risky assets
and takes on leverage to finance these investments. The agent with the high risk aversion
has a strong insurance motive against bad shocks and, therefore, is a natural buyer of
safe bonds and a natural seller of risky assets. The idea behind this model setup is as
follows. When the economy is hit with a negative shock, the collateral constraint forces
the leveraged agent to reduce consumption or to even sell risky assets to the risk-averse
agent, thereby resulting in substantial changes in the wealth distribution which in turn
affect agents’ portfolios and asset prices.
We start our analysis with an economy with a single Lucas tree that can be used as col-
lateral. In this baseline model we exogenously assume that collateral requirements are set
to the lowest possible level that still ensures that there is never default in equilibrium. To
obtain a sizable market price of risk, we follow the specification in Barro and Jin (2011)
and introduce the possibility of ‘disaster shocks’ into the otherwise standard calibration.
In this model, the effect of scarce collateral on the volatility of the tree is quantitatively
large. We then allow agents to choose from a menu of bonds with different margin require-
ments which are determined in equilibrium. Agents do trade bonds that have a positive
probability of default. However, as soon as we introduce moderate default cost, trade in
these default bonds is shut down.
The main contribution of the paper is the analysis of an economy with two trees which
have identical cash-flows but distinguish themselves by their ‘collateralizability’. We first
1Depending on the asset that is used as collateral, market forces might play an important role in
establishing margin requirements. For stocks the situation is not obvious: The Federal Reserve Board
sets minimum margin requirements for broker-dealer loans, using what is called Regulation T. In fact,
until 1974, the Fed considered initial margin percentages as an active component of monetary policy and
changed them fairly often (see Willen and Kubler (2006)). In the US housing market, there are no such
regulations and margins can be arbitrarily small.
46 CHAPTER 3. COLLATERAL AND ASSET PRICES
analyze a specification of the model in which only the first tree can be used as collateral.
In this specification, the return volatility of the collateralizable tree is significantly smaller
than that of the single tree in the baseline model. However, the volatility of the second
tree, which cannot be used as collateral, is comparable. A possible interpretation of these
findings is to identify the collateralizable tree with housing and the non-collateralizable tree
with the aggregate stock market. Using stocks as collateral is subject to many regulations
and often very costly, while individuals can easily use houses. Volatility and excess returns
for houses is much smaller than for stocks, which is in line with our findings.
We then relax the assumption of the non-collaterizability of the second tree. We assume
that a regulating agency sets an exogenous margin requirement for this tree. We find that
regulation of the second tree has a strong impact on the volatility of the first tree. In
particular, a tightening of margin requirements for the regulated tree uniformly decreases
volatility of the unregulated tree. For the regulated tree, tighter margins initially increase
the price volatility but then decrease it once margins become very large. We further show
how the regulation of margin requirements only in times when the economy exhibits strong
growth can substantially decrease volatility compared to the case of uniform regulation of
margin requirements. This result holds true both for the baseline model with a single
tree as well as the two-tree economy and suggests a strong policy recommendation for
counter-cyclical margin requirements.
Finally, we conduct a thorough sensitivity analysis and show that our qualitative results
are robust to the actual parametrization of the economy. In particular, we document that
the key effects for the two-tree economy are robust to changes in the magnitude of the
disaster shocks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 3.2.
In Section 3.3 we discuss results for economies with a single tree. Section 3.4 focuses on
economies with two trees. In Section 3.5 we consider extensions and sensitivity analysis.
Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 The Economic Model
We examine a model of an exchange economy that extends over an infinite time horizon
and is populated by infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents.
3.2.1 Infinite-Horizon Economy
This section describes the details of the infinite-horizon economy.
The Physical Economy
Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. A time-homogeneous Markov chain of exogenous shocks
(st) takes values in the finite set S = {1, . . . , S}. The S × S Markov transition matrix
is denoted by pi. We represent the evolution of time and shocks in the economy by a
countably infinite event tree Σ. The root node of the tree represents the initial shock s0.
Each node of the tree, σ ∈ Σ, describes a finite history of shocks σ = st = (s0, s1, . . . , st)
and is also called date-event. We use the symbols σ and st interchangeably. To indicate
that st
′
is a successor of st (or st itself) we write st
′
 st. We use the notation s−1 to refer
to the initial conditions of the economy prior to t = 0.
At each date-event σ ∈ Σ there is a single perishable consumption good. The economy is
populated by H agents, h ∈ H = {1, 2, . . . , H}. Agent h receives an individual endowment
in the consumption good, eh(σ) > 0, at each node. In addition, at t = 0 the agent owns
shares in Lucas trees. We interpret these Lucas trees to be physical assets such as firms,
machines, land or houses. There are A different such assets, a ∈ A = {1, 2, . . . , A}. At
the beginning of period 0, each agent h owns initial holdings θha(s
−1) ≥ 0 of tree a. We
normalize aggregate holdings in each Lucas tree, that is,
∑
h∈H θ
h
a(s
−1) = 1 for all a ∈ A.
At date-event σ, we denote agent h’s (end-of-period) holding of Lucas tree a by θha(σ).
The Lucas trees pay positive dividends da(σ) in units of the consumption good at all
date-events. We denote aggregate endowments in the economy by
e¯(σ) =
∑
h∈H
eh(σ) +
∑
a∈A
da(σ).
The agents have preferences over consumption streams representable by the following re-
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cursive utility function, see Epstein and Zin (1989),
Uh(c, st) =


[
ch(st)
]ρh
+ β
[∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)
(
Uh(c, st+1)
)αh] ρhαh


1
ρh
,
where 1
1−ρh
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and 1 − αh is the relative
risk aversion of the agent.
Security Markets
At each date-event agents can engage in security trading. Agent h can buy θha(σ) ≥ 0
shares of tree a at node σ for a price qa(σ). Agents cannot assume short positions of the
Lucas trees. Therefore, the agents make no promises of future payments when they trade
shares of physical assets and thus there is no possibility of default.
In addition to the physical assets, there are J financial securities, j ∈ J = {1, 2, . . . , J},
available for trade. These assets are one-period securities in zero-net supply. Security j
traded at node st promises a payoff of one unit of the consumption good at each immediate
successor node st+1. We denote agent h’s (end-of-period) portfolio of financial securities
at date-event σ by φh(σ) ∈ RJ and denote the price of security j at this date-event by
pj(σ). Whenever an agent assumes a short position in a financial security j, φ
h
j (σ) < 0,
she promises a payment in the next period. In our economy such promises must be backed
up by collateral holdings.
Collateral and Default
At each node σ, we associate with each financial security j ∈ J a tree a(j) ∈ A and
a collateral requirement kja(j)(σ) > 0. If an agent sells one unit of security j, then she
is required to hold kja(j)(σ) units of tree a(j) as collateral. If an asset a can be used as
collateral for different financial securities, the agent is required to buy kja(j)(σ) shares for
each security j ∈ Ja, where Ja ⊂ J denotes the set of financial securities collateralized by
the same tree a. In the next period, the agent can default on her earlier promise. In this
case the agent loses the collateral she had to put up. In turn, the buyer of the financial
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security receives this collateral associated with the initial promise.2
Since there are no penalties for default, a seller of security j at date-event st−1 defaults on
her promise at a successor node st whenever the initial promise exceeds the current value
of the collateral, that is, whenever
1 > kja(j)(s
t−1)
(
qa(j)(s
t) + da(j)(s
t)
)
.
The payment by a borrower of security j at node st is, therefore, always given by
fj(s
t) = min
{
1, kja(j)(s
t−1)
(
qa(j)(s
t) + da(j)(s
t)
)}
.
Our model includes the possibility of costly default. This feature of the model is meant to
capture default costs such as legal cost or the physical deterioration of the collateral asset.
For example, it is well known that housing properties in foreclosure deteriorate because of
moral hazard, destruction, or simple neglect. We model such costs by assuming that part
of the collateral value is lost and thus the payment received by the lender is smaller than
the value of the borrower’s collateral. Specifically, the loss is proportional to the difference
between the face value of the debt and the value of collateral, that is, the loss is
lj(s
t) = λ
(
1− kja(j)(s
t−1)
(
qa(j)(s
t) + da(j)(s
t)
))
for some parameter λ ≥ 0. The resulting payment to the lender of the loan in security j
when fj(s
t) < 1 is thus given by
rj(s
t) = max
{
0, fj(s
t)− lj(s
t)
}
= max
{
0, (1 + λ)kja(j)(s
t−1)(qa(j)(s
t) + da(j)(s
t))− λ
}
.
2Following Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) we make the strong assumption that an agent can default
on individual promises without declaring personal bankruptcy and giving up all the assets he owns. There
are no penalties for default and a borrower always defaults once the value of the debt is above the value of
the collateral. Since this implies that the decision to default on a promise is independent of the debtor, we
do not need to consider pooling of contracts as in Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2000), even though
there may be default in equilibrium. This treatment of default is somewhat unconvincing since default
does not affect a household’s ability to borrow in the future and it does not lead to any direct reduction in
consumption at the time of default. Moreover, declaring personal bankruptcy typically results in a loss of
all assets, and it is rarely possible to default on some loans while keeping the collateral for others. However,
there do exist laws for collateralizable borrowing where default is possible without declaring bankruptcy.
Examples include pawn shops and the housing market in many US states, in which households are allowed
to default on their mortgages without defaulting on other debt. It is certainly true that the recent 2008
housing crises makes this assumption look much better.
50 CHAPTER 3. COLLATERAL AND ASSET PRICES
If fj(s
t) = 1 then rj(s
t) = fj(s
t) = 1. This repayment function does not capture all costs
associated with default. For example, it does not allow for fixed costs which are independent
of how much the collateral value falls short of the repayment obligation. However, our
functional form offers the advantage that the resulting model remains tractable since the
repayment function is continuous in the value of the collateral.
The specification of the collateral requirements kja(s
t) for bond j, tree a and across date-
events st has important implications for equilibrium prices and allocations. The collateral
levels kja(s
t) are endogenously determined in equilibrium. In this paper we examine two
different rules for the endogenous determination of collateral levels. The first rule deter-
mines endogenous collateral requirements along the lines of Geanakoplos and Zame (2002).
The second rule assumes exogenously regulated capital-to-value ratios which in turn lead
to endogenous collateral requirements.
Default and Endogenous Collateral Requirements
One of the contributions of this paper is to endogenize collateral requirements in an infinite-
horizon dynamic general equilibrium model. For this purpose, our first collateral rule fol-
lows Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) who suggest a simple and
tractable way to endogenize collateral requirements. They assume that, in principle, fi-
nancial securities with any collateral requirement could be traded in equilibrium. Only the
scarcity of available collateral leads to equilibrium trade in only a small number of such
securities. Our first rule follows this approach.
Recall that the S direct successors of a node st are denoted (st, 1), . . . , (st, S) and that
Ja denotes the set of bonds collateralized by the same tree a. We define endogenous
margin requirements for bonds j ∈ Ja collateralized by the same tree a ∈ A as fol-
lows. For each shock next period, s′ ∈ S, there is at at least one bond which satisfies
kja(j)(s
t)
(
qa(j)(s
t, s′) + da(j)(s
t, s′)
)
= 1. For each bond in the set Ja the promised payoff is
equal to the collateral in (generically) exactly a single state. Generically the set Ja thus
contain exactly S bonds, however the bond with the lowest collateral requirement is re-
dundant in our model because its payoff vector is collinear with the tree’s dividend vector.
(Therefore, we consider only models with at most S − 1 bonds in our numerical analysis
of the model.) The arguments in Arau´jo, Kubler, and Schommer (2010) show that adding
additional bonds with other collateral requirements (also only using tree a as collateral) do
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not change the equilibrium allocation. In the presence of S bonds as specified above, any
bond with an intermediate collateral requirement can be replicated by holding a portfolio
of the existing bonds using the same amount of collateral.
We begin our model examinations always with economies with a single bond, J = 1,
on which agents cannot default. That is, the collateral requirements are endogenously
set to the lowest possible value which still ensures no default in the subsequent period
(this specification is similar to the collateral requirements in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)).
Formally, the resulting condition for the collateral requirement k1a(1)(s
t) of this bond is
k1a(1)(s
t)
(
min
st+1st
(
qa(1)(s
t+1) + da(1)(s
t+1)
))
= 1.
We refer to this bond as the ‘risk-free’ or ‘no-default’ bond.
To simplify the discussion of models with several bonds, it is useful to refer to the different
bonds by the number of states in which they default, respectively. In our model specifica-
tions below, the set Ja always contains a no-default bond. In models with several bonds,
the second bond defaults in precisely one state, the third bond in precisely two states,
and so on. Hence we refer to these additional bonds as the 1-default bond, the 2-default
bond etc. In the absence of default costs, some of these bonds will typically be traded in
equilibrium. However, we see below that, in our calibration, rather moderate default costs
generally suffice to shut down trade in these bonds.
Financial Markets Equilibrium with Collateral
We are now in the position to formally define the notion of a financial markets equilibrium.
To simplify the statement of the definition, we assume that for a set of trees Aˆ ⊂ A
collateral requirements are endogenous, that is for each aˆ ∈ Aˆ, there exist a set Jaˆ of
S bonds for which this tree can be used as collateral. It is helpful to define the terms
[φhj ]
+ = max(0, φhj ) and [φ
h
j ]
− = min(0, φhj ). We denote equilibrium values of a variable x
by x¯.
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Definition 3.1. A financial markets equilibrium for an economy with initial tree holdings
(θh(s−1))h∈H and initial shock s0 is a collection of agents’ portfolio holdings and consump-
tion allocations as well as security prices and collateral requirements for all trees aˆ ∈ Aˆ ⊂ A
((
θ¯h(σ), φ¯h(σ), c¯h(σ)
)
h∈H
; (q¯a(σ))a∈A , (p¯1(σ))j∈J ,
(
k¯jaˆ(σ)
)
j∈Jaˆ,aˆ∈Aˆ
)
σ∈Σ
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) Markets clear:
∑
h∈H
θ¯h(σ) = 1 and
∑
h∈H
φ¯h(σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ.
(2) For each agent h, the choices
(
θ¯h(σ), φ¯h(σ), c¯h(σ)
)
solve the agent’s utility maximiza-
tion problem,
max
θ≥0,φ,c≥0
Uh(c) s.t. for all s
t ∈ Σ
c(st) = eh(st) +
∑
j∈J
(
[φj(s
t−1)]+rj(s
t) + [φj(s
t−1)]−fj(s
t)
)
+
θh(st−1) ·
(
q¯(st) + d(st)
)
− θh(st) · q¯(st)− φh(st) · p¯(st)
0 ≤ θhaˆ(s
t) +
∑
j∈Jaˆ
k¯jaˆ(s
t)[φhj (s
t)]−, for all aˆ ∈ Aˆ.
(3) For all st and for each aˆ ∈ Aˆ, there exists for each state s′ ∈ S a financial security
j such that aˆ = a(j) and
k¯jaˆ(s
t)
(
q¯aˆ(s
t, s′) + daˆ(s
t, s′)
)
= 1.
The approach in Kubler and Schmedders (2003) can be used to prove existence. The
only non-standard part—besides the assumption of recursive utility, which can be handled
easily—is the assumption of default costs. Note, however, that our specification of these
costs still leaves us with a convex problem and standard arguments for continuity of best
responses go through.
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To approximate equilibrium numerically, we use the algorithm in Brumm and Grill (2010).
In Appendix 3.A, we describe the computations and the numerical error analysis in detail.
For the interpretation of the results to follow it is useful to understand the recursive
formulation of the model. The natural endogenous state-space of this economy consists of
all agents’ beginning of period financial wealth as a fraction of total financial wealth (i.e.
value of the trees cum dividends) in the economy. That is, we keep track of the current
shock st and of
ωh(st) =
∑
j∈J
(
[φhj (s
t−1)]+rj(s
t) + [φhj (s
t−1)]−fj(s
t)
)
+ θh(st−1) · (q¯(st) + d(st))∑
a∈A qa(s
t) + d(st)
,
across all agents h ∈ H. As in Kubler and Schmedders (2003) we assume that a recursive
equilibrium on this state space exists and compute prices, portfolios and individual con-
sumptions as a function of the exogenous shock and the distribution of financial wealth.
In our calibration we assume that shocks are iid and that these shocks only affect the
aggregate growth rate. In this case, policy- and pricing functions are independent of the
exogenous shock, thus depend on the wealth distribution only, and our results can be easily
interpreted in terms of these functions.
Regulated Collateral Requirements
The second rule for setting collateral requirements relies on regulated capital-to-value ra-
tios. An agent selling one unit of bond j with price pj(s
t) must hold collateral with a
value of at least kja(j)(s
t)qa(j)(s
t). We can interpret the difference between the value of the
collateral holding and the debt as the amount of capital an agent must put up to obtain
the loan in form of a short position in the financial security. A (not further modeled) regu-
lating agency now requires debtors to hold a certain minimal amount of capital relative to
the value of the collateral they hold. Put differently, the regulator imposes a lower bound
mja(j)(s
t) on this capital-to-value ratio,
mja(j)(s
t) =
kja(j)(s
t)qa(j)(s
t)− pj(s
t)
kja(j)(s
t)qa(j)(st)
.
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Using language from financial markets we also call these bounds margin requirements. If
the margin requirement is regulated to be mja(j)(s) in shock s ∈ S and constant over time,
then the collateral requirement at each node st is
kja(j)(s
t) =
pj(s
t)
qa(j)(st)(1−m
j
a(j)(st))
.
Note that, contrary to the exogenous margin requirement, the resulting collateral require-
ment is endogenous since it depends on equilibrium prices. For economies with regulated
margins, condition (3) of the definition of a financial markets equilibrium must be replaced
by the following condition.
(3’) For all st and for each aˆ ∈ Aˆ, the collateral requirement k¯jaˆ(s
t) of the unique bond j
with aˆ = a(j) and the given margin requirement mjaˆ(st) satisfies
k¯jaˆ(s
t) =
p¯j(s
t)
q¯aˆ(st)(1−m
j
aˆ(st))
.
Sometimes people use the term margin requirement for the capital-to-loan ratio,
kjaqa(s
t)− pj(s
t)
pj(st)
,
which does not have a natural normalization and can be larger than one. On the contrary,
the margin requirement mja(j)(st) as defined above has a natural normalization since it is
bounded above by one.
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3.2.2 Calibration
This section discusses the calibration of the model’s exogenous parameters. We calibrate
our model to yearly data.
Growth Rates
We consider a growth economy with stochastic growth rates. The aggregate endowment
at date-event st grows at the stochastic rate g(st+1) which (if no default cost are incurred)
only depends on the new shock st+1 ∈ S, that is, if either λ = 0 or fj(st+1) = 1 for all
j ∈ J , then
e¯(st+1)
e¯(st)
= g(st+1)
for all date-events st ∈ Σ. If there is default in st+1, then the endowment e¯(st+1) is reduced
by the costs of default and the growth rate is reduced respectively.
There are S = 6 exogenous shocks. We declare the first three of them, s = 1, 2, 3, to
be “disasters”. We calibrate the disaster shocks to match the first three moments of the
distribution of disasters in Barro and Jin (2011). Also following Barro and Jin, we choose
transition probabilities such that the six exogenous shocks are i.i.d. The non-disaster
shocks, s = 4, 5, 6, are then calibrated such that their standard deviation matches “nor-
mal” business cycle fluctuations with a standard deviation of 2 percent and an average
growth rate of 2.5 percent, which results in an overall average growth rate of about 2 per-
cent. We sometimes find it convenient to call shock s = 4 a “recession” since g(4) = 0.966
indicates a moderate decrease in aggregate endowments. Table 3.1 provides the resulting
growth rates and probability distribution for the six exogenous shocks of the economy.
Shock s 1 2 3 4 5 6
g(s) 0.566 0.717 0.867 0.966 1.025 1.089
pi(s) 0.005 0.005 0.024 0.065 0.836 0.065
Table 3.1: Growth Rates and Distribution of Exogenous Shocks
In our results sections below we report that collateral requirements have quantitatively
strong effects on equilibrium prices. Obviously, the question arises what portion of these
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effects is due to the large magnitude of the disaster shocks. We address this issue in
the discussion of our results. In addition, Section 3.5 examines the equilibrium effects of
collateral requirements for an economy with less severe disaster shocks.
Endowments and Dividends
There are H = 2 types of agents in the economy, the first type, h = 1, being less risk-averse
than the second. Each agent h receives a fixed share of aggregate endowments as individual
endowments, that is, eh(st) = ηhe¯(st). We assume that η1 = 0.092, η2 = 0.828. Agent 1
receives 10 percent of all individual endowments, and agent 2 receives the remaining 90
percent of all individual endowments. The remaining part of aggregate endowments enters
the economy as dividends of Lucas trees, that is, da(s
t) = δa(st)e¯(s
t) and
∑
a δa(s) = 0.08
for all s ∈ S.
Several comments on the distribution of the aggregate endowment are in order. First, we
abstract from idiosyncratic income shocks because it is difficult to disentangle idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks for a model with two types of agents. We conjecture that our effects
would likely be larger if we considered a model with a continuum of agents receiving i.i.d.
idiosyncratic shocks. Second, a dividend share of 8 percent may appear a little too low if
one interprets the tree as consisting of both the aggregate stock market as well as housing
wealth. However, this number is in line with Chien and Lustig (2010) who base their
calibration on NIPA data. We conduct some sensitivity analysis below and, in particular,
report results for the case
∑
a δa(s) = 0.15 and thus η
1 = 0.085, η2 = 0.765. Third, for
simplicity we do not model trees’ and other assets’ dividends to have different stochastic
characteristics as aggregate consumption. Fourth, in Section 3.4 we examine an economy
with two Lucas trees. For such economies, we want to interpret the first tree as aggregate
housing and its dividends as housing services while we interpret the second tree as the
aggregate stock market. Following Cecchetti, Stephen, and Mark (1993), we calibrate
dividends to be 4 percent of aggregate consumption which leaves housing services to be of
the same size. In order to focus on the effects of collateral and margin requirements, we
assume that the two trees have the exact same dividend payments, that is, in the absence of
collateral constraints these two trees would be identical assets. Therefore, this calibration
allows for a careful examination of the impact of different collateral properties of the two
trees.
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Utility Parameters
The choice of an appropriate value for the IES is rather difficult. On the one hand, several
studies that rely on micro-data find values of about 0.2 – 0.8, see, for example, Attanasio
and Weber (1993). On the other hand, Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003) use data
on stock owners only and conclude that the IES for such investors is likely to be above one.
Barro (2009) finds that for a successful calibration of a representative-agent asset-pricing
model the IES needs to be larger than one.
In our benchmark calibration both agents have identical IES of 1.5, that is, ρ1 = ρ2 = 1/3.
In our sensitivity analysis we also consider the case of both agents having an IES of 0.5.
For this specification the quantitative results slightly change compared to the benchmark
calibration, but the qualitative insights remain intact.
Agent 1 has a risk aversion of 0.5 and so α1 = 0.5 while agent 2’s risk aversion is 6
and thus α2 = −5. Recall the weights for the two agents in the benchmark calibration,
η1 = 0.092 and η2 = 0.828. The majority of the population is therefore very risk-averse,
while 10 percent of households have low risk aversion. This heterogeneity of the risk
aversion among the agents is the main driving force for volatility in the model. (Agent 1
wants to hold the risky assets in the economy and leverages to do so. In a bad shock, his
de-leveraging leads to excess volatility.) In the equilibria of our model, the risky assets are
mostly held by agent 1, but there are extended periods of time where also agent 2 holds
part of the asset. Loosely speaking, we therefore choose the fraction of very risk-averse
agents to match observed stock-market participation.
Finally, we set βh = 0.95 for both h = 1, 2, which turns out to give us a good match for
the annual risk-free rate.
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3.3 Economies with a Single Lucas Tree
We first consider economies with a single Lucas tree available as collateral. We show that
scarce collateral has a large effect on the price volatility of this tree and examine how the
magnitude of this effect depends on the specification of margin requirements. This section
sets the stage for our analysis of economies with two trees in Section 3.4.
3.3.1 Collateral and Volatility with a Single Risk-Free Bond
The starting point of our analysis is an economy with a single Lucas tree and a single
bond. We assume that the collateral requirements on the single bond ensure that there is
no default in equilibrium and so the bond is risk-free. We calibrate this baseline model
according to the parameters presented above.
For an evaluation of the quantitative effects of scarce collateral, we benchmark our results
against those for two much simpler models. The model B1: No bonds is an economy with
a single tree and no bond. Thus, agents in this economy cannot borrow. The model B2:
Unconstrained is an economy in which agents can use their entire endowment as collat-
eral. This model is equivalent to a model with natural borrowing constraints. Table 3.2
reports four statistics for each of the three economies. (See Appendix 3.A for a description
of the estimation procedure.) Throughout the paper we measure tree-price volatility by
the average standard deviation of tree returns over a long horizon. Another meaningful
measure is the average one-period-ahead conditional price volatility. These two measures
are closely correlated for our models. In Table 3.2 we report both measures but omit the
second one in the remainder of the paper. We also report average interest rates and equity
premia. While our paper does not focus on an analysis of these measures, we do check
them because we want to ensure that our calibration delivers reasonable values for these
measures.
Recall that in our calibration agents of type 1 are much less risk averse than type 2 agents.
And, therefore, in the long run agent 1 holds the entire Lucas tree in model B1 with no
borrowing and agent 2 effectively lives in autarchy. As a result the tree price is determined
entirely by the Euler equation of agent 1, and so the price volatility is as low as in the model
with a representative agent whose preferences exhibit very low risk aversion. The wealth
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Model Std returns 1-period price vol. Risk-free rate EP
B1: No bonds 5.33 4.98 n/a n/a
B2: Unconstrained 5.38 5.05 5.88 0.55
Scarce Collateral 8.14 7.54 1.10 3.86
Table 3.2: Three Economies with a Single Tree (all Figures in Percent)
distribution remains constant across all date-events. In the second benchmark model B2
the less risk-averse agent 1 holds the entire tree during the vast majority of time periods.
A bad shock to the economy leads to shifts in the wealth distribution and a decrease of
the tree price. However, since in our calibration shocks are iid, these shifts in the wealth
distribution have generally small effects on prices (except in the very low-probability case
of several consecutive disaster shocks). The resulting price volatility in model B2 is of
similar magnitude as the volatility in B1. Moreover, in the model B2 the risk-free rate
is high and the equity premium is very low. Despite the presence of disaster shocks, the
market price of risk is low because it is borne almost entirely by agent 1 who has very low
risk aversion.
Table 3.2 shows that both first and second moments show substantial differences when
we compare models without collateral requirements to a model with tight collateral con-
straints. The perhaps most striking result reported in Table 3.2 is that volatility in our
baseline economy is about 50 percent larger than in the two benchmark models without
borrowing (B1: No bonds) and with natural borrowing constraints (B2: Unconstrained),
respectively. The standard deviation of returns is 8.14 percent in the baseline economy but
only 5.33 percent and 5.38 percent for the benchmark models B1 and B2, respectively.3
Collateral constraints drastically increase the volatility in the standard incomplete markets
model. Figure 3.1 shows the typical behavior of four variables in the long run during a
3The stock return volatility in our baseline economy is considerably smaller than the volatility in U.S.
data. For comparison, Lettau and Uhlig (2002) report that the quarterly standard deviation of returns of
S&P-500 stocks in post-war US data is about 7.5 percent. Similarly, Fei, Ding, and Deng (2010) report an
annual volatility of about 14.8 percent for the period January 1987 to May 2008. However, it is important
to note that we want to interpret the aggregate tree as a mix of stocks and housing assets. The volatility
of housing prices is U.S. data is much lower. Fei, Ding, and Deng (2010) report an annual volatility of
the Case/Shiller housing price index of less than 3 percent (for January 1987 to May 2008). A similar
comment applies to the equity premium. While the average risk-free rate roughly matches U.S. data, the
equity premium is substantially lower than in the data. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 3.4
for an economy with two trees.
60 CHAPTER 3. COLLATERAL AND ASSET PRICES
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
1.5
2
2.5
3
Normalized Price of Tree
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Tree Holding of Agent 1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
Price of No−Default Bond
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
No−Default Bond Holding of Agent 1
Figure 3.1: Snapshot from a Simulation of the Baseline Model
simulation for a time window of 200 periods. The first graph displays agent 1’s holding of
the Lucas tree. The second graph shows the normalized tree price, that is, the equilibrium
price of the tree divided by aggregate consumption in the economy. The last two graphs
show the price and agent 1’s holding of the risk-free bond, respectively. In the sample
displayed in Figure 3.1, the disaster shock s = 3 (smallest disaster with a drop of aggregate
consumption of 13.3 percent) occurs in periods 71 and 155 while disaster shock 2 occurs
in period 168 and disaster shock 1 (worst disaster) hits the economy in period 50.
When a bad shock occurs, both the current dividend and the expected net present value of
all future dividends of the tree decrease. As a result the price of the tree drops, but in the
absence of further effects, the normalized price should remain the same since shocks are iid.
(That’s exactly what happens in the benchmark model B1.) In our baseline economy with
collateral constraints, however, additional effects occur in equilibrium. First, note that
agent 1 is typically leveraged, that is, when a bad shock occurs his beginning-of-period
financial wealth falls relative to the financial wealth of agent 2. This effect is the strongest
when the worst disaster shock 1 occurs. If agent 1 was fully leveraged in the previous
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period then her wealth decreases to zero because shock 1 always determines the collateral
requirement kja(j).
High leverage leads to large changes in the wealth distribution when bad shocks occur.
The fact that collateral is scarce in our economy now implies that these changes in the
wealth distribution strongly affect equilibrium portfolios and prices. Since agent 1 cannot
borrow against her future labor income, she can only afford to buy a small portion of the
tree if her financial wealth is low. In equilibrium, therefore, the price has to be sufficiently
low to induce the much more risk-averse agent 2 to buy a substantial portion of the tree.
On top of that within-period effect, there is a dynamic effect at work. As agent 1 is poorer
today, she will also be poorer tomorrow (at least in shocks 2-6) implying that the price
of the tree tomorrow is depressed as well. This further reduces the price that agent 2 is
willing to pay for the tree today. Clearly, this dynamic effect is active not only for one
but for several periods ahead, which is displayed in Figure 3.1 by the slow recovery of
the normalized price of the tree after bad shocks. Figure 3.1 shows that the total impact
of the above described effects is very strong for shock s = 1 but also large for shock 2.
Note that the prices are normalized prices, so the drop of the actual tree price is much
larger than displayed in the figure. In disaster shock 1, agent 1 is forced to sell almost the
entire tree and the normalized price drops by almost 30 percent (the actual price drops
by approximately 60 percent). In shock 2 she sells less than half of the tree but the price
effect is still substantial. In shock 3 the effect is still clearly visible, although the agent has
to sell only very little of her tree.
While the effects of collateral and leverage on volatility are very large, it is important to
note that in the baseline specification of our model with a single tree and a single bond
there is no financial accelerator. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999)
and others highlight the idea that in the presence of collateral constraint the fact that
the price of collateral decreases might make it more difficult for the borrower to maintain
his debt position because collateral requirements increase in anticipation of a value of the
collateral in the next period which is now lower than if the shock had not happend. In the
baseline case, this effect is absent for two reasons. First, whenever agent 1 is constrained,
the collateral requirement kja(j) is independent of today’s price of the collateral, it is in fact
constant. This is because the collateral requirement is determined by tomorrow’s tree price
(plus dividend) in case of the worst shock. If this shock occurs and agent 1 is constrained
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today, he has to use his entire tree holding to repay his debt. Hence, no matter how large
agent 1’s tree holding is today, he ends up with zero financial wealth tomorrow. This
implies a specific price for the tree tomorrow in shock 1 which is independent of today’s
price (as long as agent 1 is constrained) and consequently a specific collateral requirement
today4. Second, an examination of the bond price in Figure 3.1 reveals an important general
equilibrium effect in our economy that counteracts an increase of the margin requirement.
When a bad shock occurs and the share of financial wealth of agent 1 decreases, then the
demand of the now relatively richer agent 2 for the risk-free asset increases the bond price
substantially. In fact, occasionally the interest rate even becomes negative. As a result
of the constant collateral requirement, the increase in the bond price and the decrease in
the tree price the equilibrium margin requirement actually decreases substantially in a bad
shock.
In sum, scarce collateral plays an important role for the volatility of the tree price because
it leads to large price drops in bad shocks since agent 1 cannot borrow against future labor
income. As we would expect, this effect depends on the amount of available collateral
in the economy. Figure 3.2 illustrates this point. The figure depicts the tree’s average
return volatility and the fraction of times the collateral constraint is binding for agent 1
(i.e. the probability of constraint being binding) as a function of the dividend share δ in
the economy.
For very small values of δ, there is only little collateral in the economy and so the collateral
constraint is almost always binding. However, the stock is so small that agent 1 does not
have to sell the stock even if the economy is hit by an extremely bad aggregate shock. The
resulting return volatility is relatively small. As δ increases the probability of the collateral
constraint being binding decreases rapidly but the effects of it being binding become larger.
There is an interior maximum for the stock-return volatility around δ = 0.07. Although the
constraint is much less often binding than for a smaller tree, the trade-off between agent
1 being forced to sell the tree and agent 1 getting into this situation leads to maximal
volatility. As δ increases further, the constraint becomes binding much less frequently and
eventually at δ = 1 the stock return volatility is very low, simply because the collateral
constraint never binds and so collateral plays no role. This situation is identical to the case
4If we assume that the tree’s dividends cannot be used as collateral, this argument is no longer correct.
However, for our calibration the effects of this assumption are quantitatively negligable.
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Figure 3.2: Volatility as a Function of the Dividend Share
of natural borrowing constraints where a binding constraint would imply zero consumption
for the borrower.
3.3.2 Collateral and Several Bonds
In the economy with a single tree and a single bond, equilibrium margin requirements are
sufficiently high to ensure that there is no default. The bond is risk-free and always pays
its face value. We now examine whether the observed results are just a consequence of this
restrictive assumption. In the enhanced model a menu of bonds is available for trade and
the accompanying collateral requirements are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Full Set of Bonds without Costly Default
Our calibrated model with S = 6 exogenous states allows the analysis of economies with
five bonds. As explained above, these bonds are characterized by the number of shocks in
which they default and so we call them no-default bond, 1-default bond, 2-default bond,
etc. Figure 3.3 shows the portfolio holdings of agent 1 as well as the normalized tree price
along the same simulated series of shocks as in Figure 3.1 above.
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Figure 3.3: Snapshot from a Simulation of the Model with 1 Tree and 5 Bonds
During “normal times” (that is, if the last disaster shock occurred sufficiently long ago)
only the no-default bond is traded in equilibrium. (There is a tiny amount of trade in
the 1-default bond in recessions, shock 4, which is quantitatively negligible.) In normal
times the agents’ portfolios resemble those in an economy with a single risk-free bond. The
risk-averse agent 2 holds the risk-free bond while agent 1 holds the risky tree and is short
in the bond.
Disaster shocks are the only reason for equilibrium trade in default bonds. In our economy,
the risk-averse agent 2 always seeks to buy an asset that insures him against bad aggregate
shocks — only the risk-free bond can play this role. However, the risky default bonds play
an important role once a disaster shock occurs. Agent 1 no longer needs to sell the stock
but is now able to raise additional funds by selling default bonds to agent 2. Such a trade
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shifts some of the tree’s risk to agent 2 who demands a high interest rate for assuming
such risk. But the default bonds are still less risky than the tree and thus preferred by
the risk-averse agent. In fact, the presence of the default bonds enables agent 1 to always
hold the entire tree. Figure 3.3 shows that after an occurrence of the worst disaster shock
1, which happens in period 50, agent 1 is able to hold on to the entire tree and to sell the
4-default and the 3-default bond to agent 2. As the economy recovers, agent 1 sells the
1-default bond to agent 2 and holds a short-position in this bond for approximately 10
periods until her wealth has recovered sufficiently so that she is able to leverage exclusively
in the default free bond.
Despite the fact that the leveraged agent 1 no longer has to sell the tree after bad shocks,
such shocks continue to have a strong impact on asset prices. Figure 3.3 shows that the
normalized tree price decreases in all three disaster shocks as well as in recessions, just as
in an economy with a single risk-free bond, see Figure 3.1. By selling the default bonds to
the risk-averse agent 2, agent 1 shifts the tree’s (tail) risk to agent 2. This circumstance
must be reflected in the equilibrium price. This reasoning becomes clear if we considered
the case of identical dividends in shocks 5 and 6. Under this scenario, the tree and the
4-default bond have identical payoffs and hence it should be irrelevant for the price of the
tree who holds it, that is, whether agent 1 holds it financed by a short position in the
4-default bond or agent 2 holds it directly.
Moreover, unlike in the previous model with one bond, the financial accelerator now plays
a role. A lower tree holding of agent 1 in this period reduces the price of the tree in the
next period in shocks 2-6 and hence makes it more difficult for agent 1 to hold default
bonds.
Table 3.3 reports the tree-return volatility for economies with 1, 2, . . . , 5 bonds, respec-
tively. The presence of a bond that defaults only in shock 1 (when the economy shrinks
by 43.4 percent) leads to a decrease in the volatility of the tree price. A third bond that
defaults in shocks 1 and 2 leads to an additional small reduction of volatility. The impact
of additional bonds is negligible. This fact is not surprising since we observed that these
bonds are rarely traded.
Unfortunately, the fact that investors only trade bonds with a high probability of default
during bad times seems counterfactual. Several features of our model may lead to this
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One bond Two bonds Three bonds Four bonds All bonds
Std returns 8.14 7.87 7.84 7.84 7.84
Table 3.3: The Effect of Endogenous Margins on Return Volatility
λ = 0 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.05 λ = 0.10 λ = 0.2 λ = 0.25
Std dev tree return 7.84 7.87 7.98 8.12 8.15 8.14
Total trading 1.260 1.236 1.183 1.161 1.126 1.123
No-default bond 1.110 1.099 1.076 1.076 1.099 1.123
1-default bond 0.084 0.080 0.075 0.085 0.027 0
2-default bond 0.034 0.034 0.032 0 0 0
3-default bond 0.026 0.023 0 0 0 0
4-default bond 0.006 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.4: The Effect of Default Costs on Tree-Return Volatility and Bond Trading Volume
result. Clearly bad times are often persistent and not iid as in our calibration. More im-
portantly, default is typically costly. We next show that fairly small default costs eliminate
trade in default bonds.
Costly Default
Until now our treatment of default is somewhat unsatisfactory since it neglects both private
and social costs of default. We now introduce default costs as described in Section 3.2.1
above. Table 3.4 shows how the trading volume of the default bonds changes as a function
of the cost parameter λ. The reported trading volume is the average absolute bond holding
of agent 1 (which is the same as that of agent 2) over the simulation path.
In the absence of default costs (λ = 0), the average trading volume of all bonds is nonzero.
As we observed in the previous section, it is substantial for the no-default and 1-default
bond and rather small for the remaining bonds. Proportional default cost of as low as 10
percent (λ = 0.1) result in zero trade for the bonds defaulting in two or more states. For
default costs of 25 percent, trade in any type of default bond ceases to exist. Only the
risk-free bond is traded and the resulting equilibrium prices and allocations are identical
to our baseline economy above.
Recall from the description in Section 3.2.1 that the cost is proportional to the difference
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of the face value of the bond and the value of the underlying collateral. Therefore, a
proportional cost of 25 percent means a much smaller cost as a fraction of the underlying
collateral. Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) find an average ‘foreclosure discount’ of 27
percent for foreclosures in Massachusetts from 1988 until 2008. This discount is measured
as a percentage of the total value of the house. As a percentage of the difference between
the house value and face value of the debt this figure would be substantially larger. A
value of λ = 0.25, therefore, seems certainly realistic and is, if anything, too small when
we compare it to figures from the U.S. housing market.
Table 3.4 also reveals that the trading volume of the 1-default bond remains stable up to
default costs of around 10 percent when other default bonds are no longer traded. The
1-default bond remains an attractive asset in this economy even for moderate default costs.
It is traded when agent 1 is poor. Compared to the no-default bond, it allows to take on
more debt for a given amount of collateral. Compared to bonds that default in more states,
the expected default costs are much lower. For these reasons, the 1-default bond is the
preferred choice in this situation.
Table 3.4 also shows that the volatility of the tree return increases as cost of default
increases, and for sufficiently high default cost the economy is the same as the baseline
economy with a single risk-free bond. It appears that an economy with default costs of
20 percent and trade in the 1-default bond exhibits slightly higher return volatility than
the baseline economy. This feature is due to the fact that default implies real losses in our
economy which make the economic impact of the worst disaster shock even worse since
default leads to a further drop in aggregate endowment.
3.3.3 Volatility with Regulated Margin Requirements
As a final step in the analysis of economies with a single collateralizable tree, we consider
the case of regulated collateral requirements as described in Section 3.2.1. We assume
that there is a regulatory agency setting minimal margin requirements (just as in stock
markets). We first consider margin requirements that are constant across all shocks, so
mja(j)(s
t) does not depend on the current date-event st. As margin requirements become
larger, we observe two opposing effects. On the one hand, the amount of leverage decreases
in equilibrium which leads to less de-leveraging in disaster shocks which in turn leads to
smaller price changes. On the other hand, the collateral constraint is more likely to become
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Figure 3.4: Volatility as a Function of the Margin Requirement
binding in equilibrium which increases the probability of de-leveraging episodes which in
turn should lead to a higher volatility of the tree return. The solid line in Figure 3.4
displays the resulting tree return volatility.
Initially, volatility increases as margin requirements increase. At a margin level of about
70 percent, the volatility reaches its maximum. A further tightening of margins then de-
creases volatility substantially. Of course, as the margin level approaches one the economy
approaches the benchmark model (B1: No bonds) without borrowing and so volatility
becomes very small.
At a margin level of 60 percent, the implied collateral requirement uniformly exceeds the
corresponding varying levels for the no-default bond under the rule of endogenous collateral
requirements in our baseline economy analyzed above. Therefore, the regulated bond is
default-free for all possible values of mja(j) in Figure 3.4. Interestingly, for values of the
margin level between 60 and 80 percent, the regulated bond leads to higher tree return
volatility than the no-default bond under the rule of endogenous collateral requirements.
As a last exercise, we examine an economy in which margins are only regulated in booms
while in recessions and disasters they are left to the market. In particular, we assume that
in shocks 1 through 4 collateral requirements are endogenously determined at the level
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of the risk-free bond as in our baseline economy, while a regulating agency sets margin
requirements in the shocks with positive growth. We assume that the margin levels are set
to the same level in both shocks 5 and 6. The dashed line in Figure 3.4 shows the resulting
tree return volatility.
It is readily apparent that limiting the regulation of margin requirements to boom times
reduces the tree return volatility substantially if margin levels are sufficiently high. For
example, boom-time margin levels of 80 percent lead to a return volatility of 6.5 percent
as compared to values exceeding 8 percent when collateral requirements are determined
endogenously or margin regulation is state-independent.
Why is state-dependent regulation so much better in reducing volatility? As with state-
independent margins, agent 1 holds less leverage in good times, which leaves him with
more financial wealth if a bad shock hits. In addition, collateral constraints are now looser
in case of a bad shock and agent 1 may retain an even larger portion of the tree. In the
extreme, if margin requirements in booms are well above 80 percent, agent 1 even increases
its tree holding in case of a bad shock. This increases the relative price of the tree and
thus dampens the drop in the absolute price. All in all, setting conservative margins in
good times turns out to be a powerful tool to dampen the negative impact of bad shocks.
70 CHAPTER 3. COLLATERAL AND ASSET PRICES
3.4 Two Trees
Up to this point our analysis focused on an economy with a single tree representing aggre-
gate collateralizable wealth in the economy. However, households trade in various assets
and durable goods. Some of them, e.g. houses, can be used as collateral very easily and at
comparatively low interest rates, others assets, e.g. stocks, can only be used as collateral
for loans with high margin requirements and typically very high interest rates (see Willen
and Kubler (2006)), and still others, like works of art, cannot be used as collateral at all.
These observations motivate us to examine a model with two Lucas trees. For simplicity,
we assume that the two trees have identical cash-flows and distinguish themselves only by
the extent to which they can be used as collateral. This model feature allows for a clean
analysis of the effect of collateral. We consider two different cases. First, we assume that
tree 1 can be used as collateral with endogenous margin requirements, while tree 2 cannot
be used as collateral. We then allow the second tree to serve as collateral, but we assume
that the collateral requirements on loans backed by tree 2 are exogenously regulated. In
both cases we find that the two assets’ price dynamics are substantially different, despite
the fact that they have identical cash-flows. Furthermore, we show that tightening the
margin requirements on the regulated tree has a strong impact on the return volatility of
the non-regulated tree. This effect proves to be quantitatively important. Our analysis
suggests that this effect should be carefully considered in any policy discussion on the
regulation of margin requirements.
3.4.1 Only one Tree can be Used as Collateral
We first consider the case where the second tree cannot be used as collateral. As before in
an economy with a single tree, default costs of λ = 0.25 suffice to shut down all trade in
default bonds. We therefore restrict attention to an economy in which only the no-default
bond is traded. We conclude the analysis in this section below with a brief discussion of
an economy with costless default and argue that it produces similar quantitative results.
Table 3.5 reports moments of the two trees’ returns as well as the interest rate and aggregate
moments. Observe that the two trees exhibit substantially different returns despite the fact
that the two trees have identical cash-flows. The tree that can be used as collateral, tree 1,
now exhibits much lower return volatility and a slightly lower expected excess return than
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Std returns EP agg Std returns agg Risk-free rate Equity-premium
Tree 1 6.64 3.69
7.04 0.38 4.50
Tree 2 8.05 6.31
Table 3.5: Moments of Trees’ Returns (only Tree 1 Collateralizable)
the single tree in the baseline economy in Section 3.3. The standard deviation of returns
of the second tree is much higher than that of tree 1. In fact, it is comparable to the
corresponding value (8.14) of the single tree in the baseline economy. Turning to equity
premia, the excess return of tree 2 — the tree that cannot be used as collateral — is now
almost twice as large as it is for the single tree in the baseline economy and is similar to
figures observed in the data.
To understand the price dynamics of the two trees, we consider the analogue of Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.5 shows the time series of eight variables along ‘our’ sample path. The first two
graphs show the (normalized) price and the first agent’s holding of tree 1, respectively.
The next two graphs display the corresponding values for tree 2. The fifth and sixth graph
show the corresponding values for the no-default bond. The price and holding graphs
reveal three features of the equilibrium. First, the price volatility of tree 1 is much lower
than that of the single tree in the baseline economy. Secondly, the price volatility for tree
2 is larger than for tree 1 and its average price is much smaller. Lastly, agent 1 holds tree
1 the entire time (except for a tiny blip in disaster shock 1) but frequently sells tree 2. The
second-to-last graph in the figure shows the endogenous margin requirement and the last
graph depicts the collateral premium for tree 1. This quantity is the difference between
the actual price of the tree and next period’s payoff, normalized with agent 1’s marginal
utilities. Whenever agent 1 is unconstrained then this value is zero. However, when agent
1 becomes constrained, the collateral premium is significant.
Our observations lead us to a simple explanation of the first moments for the two tree
prices. Tree 1 is more valuable to agent 1 because of its collateral value — when agent 1 is
fully leveraged the value of the tree exceeds next period’s discounted (with agent 1’s state
prices) cash-flows since it provides value for agent 1 as collateral. Since both trees have
identical cash-flows, an agent can only be induced to hold tree 2 if it pays a higher average
return. The specific magnitude of the difference between the two tree prices is, of course,
a quantitative issue. In our calibration with a reasonable market price of risk, the effect
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Figure 3.5: Snapshot from a Simulation of the Model with 2 Trees and 5 Bonds
is indeed large — the average excess return of the second tree is now comparable to that
observed in U.S. stock market data.
There are several key factors that play a role for asset price volatility in the two-tree
economy. For a discussion of these factors it is helpful to consider the policy and price
functions in Figure 3.6. When faced with financial difficulties after a bad shock, agent 1
holds on to tree 1 for as long as possible, because this tree allows her to hold a short-
position in the bond. (In fact, as the bond-holding function of agent 1 in Figure 3.6 shows,
agent 2 never goes short in the bond. Therefore, the collateral value is one of the reasons
why tree 1 is much more valuable to agent 1.) So, after suffering a reduction in financial
wealth, agent 1 first sells tree 2. In fact, in our calibration agent 1 only sells a portion of
tree 1 after she sold off the entire tree 2. In our sample path this happens only after the
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Figure 3.6: Price and Policy Functions of the Model with 2 Trees and 5 Bonds
worst disaster shock in period 50. (Of course, the policy functions in Figure 3.6 show that
it would happen in a more pronounced way after two or more consecutive disaster shocks
but such a sequence has extremely low probability.) Whenever agent 1 sells a portion of a
risky tree to agent 2 its price must fall, just as in the single-tree baseline economy. And so
one key factor contributing to the different volatility levels of the two trees is that tree 2
is traded much more often and in larger quantities than tree 1.
Furthermore, since tree 2 is not collateralizable, only half of the aggregate tree can be used
as collateral. This constraint limits the ability of agent 1 to leverage and consequently
makes her less vulnerable to negative aggregate shocks. This factor reduces the return
volatility of both trees.
If agent 1 holds both trees and then becomes poorer after a bad shock, the prices of both
trees fall. But since the agent first sells tree 2, the price of tree 2 falls much faster than the
price of tree 1. In fact, the price drop for tree 1 is dampened by the onset of the collateral
premium. This effect also contributes to the difference in the return volatilities of the two
trees.
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Finally, there is another key effect that was not present in the one-tree baseline economy.
Now the financial accelerator plays an important role! In ‘normal times’ agent 1 holds both
trees but is fully leveraged. In a bad shock, agent 1 must sell part of tree 2 which makes
him poorer in the subsequent period. This in turn increases the collateral requirement this
period, leading to an increase in the margin requirement despite the fact that the interest
rate decreases. This effect is clearly visible in the second-to-last graph of Figure 3.5.
Whenever a bad shock occurs the margin requirement increases.
In sum, the fact that only 4 percent of aggregate output are collateralizable in this economy
leads to a decrease in leverage and to much smaller movements in the wealth distribution
than in the baseline economy. This effect reduces the return volatility of tree 1. For
tree 2 such a reduction effect is strongly counteracted through two channels. First, the
price of tree 2 is not stabilized by a collateral premium since this tree cannot be used as
collateral. Secondly, a decrease in the holdings of tree 2 leads to an increase in the margin
requirements for loans on tree 1 which in terms forces agent 1 to sell more of tree 2 (recall
that initially he does not sell tree 1, since only this tree can be used as collateral).
While we do not want to push the interpretation of our results too far, it is worthwhile to
note that a natural interpretation of the two trees is the aggregate stock market versus the
aggregate housing market. As Willen and Kubler (2006) report, it is much more difficult
to use stocks instead of a house as collateral. The data clearly shows that volatility in the
stock market is much higher than in the housing market, see Fei, Ding, and Deng (2010).
This interpretation clearly should be taken with some caution, since we do not really have a
good model of the housing market — such a model would need to include transaction costs,
non-divisibilities, and certainly different cash-flow dynamics. Nevertheless it is worthwhile
to point out that the equity premium for tree 2 is similar to what can be observed in the
data for stock returns. Moreover, volatility of “housing returns” (tree 1) is much smaller
than that of stock returns.
We complete our discussion of the economy in which the second tree cannot be used as
collateral with a robustness check and consider the case of costless default, λ = 0. Just as
in the economy with a single tree, the default bonds are traded if the economy experiences
a disaster shock. However, trade in these bonds is typically much smaller because agent 1’s
financial wealth remains larger, as we discussed above. Overall, zero default costs lead to
very small changes in the first and second moments. Without default costs, the standard
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deviation of tree 1’s return drops from 6.64% to 6.56% while the standard deviation of tree
2’s return drops from 8.05% to 7.98%.
3.4.2 One Tree is Regulated
Until now we have assumed that tree 2 cannot be used as collateral. This assumption is
rather restrictive if not unrealistic. Stocks can be used as collateral, however, margins are
regulated and large, and interest rates are much higher than mortgage rates. Therefore,
we assume now that margins for tree 2 are set exogenously while collateral requirements
for tree 1 are endogenous. Throughout this section, we assume default costs of λ = 0.25
which suffice to shut down all trade in default bonds.
State-Independent Regulation of Tree 2
As before, we first consider margin requirements that are constant across states. The effect
of an exogenous margin requirement is obvious in the limit as the requirement m2 for tree
2 approaches one. In this case the resulting collateral requirement k2 diverges to infinity
and so the model tends to the economy of Section 3.4.1 in which this tree cannot be used
as collateral. Figure 3.7 display the volatility of both trees’ returns as a function of the
margin m2 set for tree 2. Observe that as m2 tends to one, the return volatilities for the
two trees approach the values from Table 3.5, namely 6.64% and 8.05%, respectively.
Figure 3.7 shows the return volatilities for values of m2 between 0.6 and 1. The lowest
value of 0.6 of the margin requirement exceeds the endogenously determined (unregulated)
margin requirement of tree 1 in all states. As a result, the return volatility of tree 2 is
higher that that of tree 1. If margin requirements on tree 2 are now increased, the volatility
of this tree’s return initially increases, while the volatility of the freely collateralizable tree
1 substantially decreases. The volatility of tree 2 is largest when its exogenous margin
requirement is quite high (about 75 percent). After this peak, the volatility of tree 2
decreases until the boundary value of one has been reached. At this point tree 2 can no
longer be used as collateral. The quantitatively most interesting case is a regulated margin
requirement of 75 percent. At this point, the volatility of tree 2 is above 8.6 percent while
the volatility of tree 2 is below 7.5 percent. Aggregated volatility is still high, but it is
readily apparent that the regulation of tree 2 has substantial effects on its own volatility
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as well as on the volatility of the other, unregulated, tree 1.
For an interpretation of the observed volatility variation, note that an increase of the margin
requirement m2 of tree 2 has two immediate effects. This tree becomes less attractive as
collateral and the agents’ (aggregated) ability to leverage decreases. These two effects
influence agent 1’s portfolio decisions after a bad shock occurs. First, when agent 1 must
de-leverage her position, then she first sells tree 2. In equilibrium, this effect occurs more
often as m2 increases. Initially this effect leads to an increase in the return volatility of
tree 2. The second effect, a reduced ability to leverage, decreases the return volatility of
tree 1. Similar to the effect we observed in the one-tree economy in Section 3.3, the return
volatility of tree 1 decreases as agent 1’s ability to leverage decreases. The reason for this
effect is the increased probability with which she can hold onto the tree after a bad shock.
Observe that the two described effects counteract each other for tree 2. For small increases
of m2 above 0.6, the first effect dominates the second and the tree’s return volatility in-
creases. As m2 increases further, the second effect eventually dominates and the return
volatility of tree 2 starts to decrease. Moreover, as the margin requirement on tree 2 be-
comes large, price effects as a result of agent 1 de-leveraging her positions become smaller.
Recall that whenever agent 1 is collateral constrained, then the price of the underlying
collateralized tree reflects a collateral premium. Since agent 2 never enters leveraged po-
sitions, this price impact is never present when agent 2 holds tree 2. As a result the
collateral premium affects the price volatility of tree 2. This effect is greatly diminished
as m2 becomes sufficiently large. Put differently, the impact of the collateral premium on
the return volatility fades as m2 gets large.
To support this interpretation of our results, it is interesting to consider the excess returns
of the two trees as a function of the margin requirement m2 on tree 2. Figure 3.8 shows
that the relation between excess return and m2 is monotone for tree 2. As its margin
requirement increases, the collateral premium and the price of the tree decrease and the
average return increases. For tree 1, average excess returns remain more or less constant.
They initially decrease slightly, then increase slightly. Aggregate excess returns increase,
but clearly the quantitatively most striking effect is on the returns of tree 2. Collateral
constraints and regulated margins clearly have a quantitatively significant impact on asset
prices in this economy.
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Figure 3.7: Volatility of Tree 1 and 2 as a Function of the Margin Requirement on Tree 2
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Figure 3.8: Excess Returns of Tree 1 and 2 as a Function of the Requirement on Tree 2
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State-Dependent Regulation of Tree 2
Our results so far have shown that, for moderate margin requirements between 0.6 and
0.75, it is impossible to reduce volatility for both trees by adjusting the regulated margin
of tree 2. A small change of the margin requirement always reduces volatility of one tree
at the expense of the other. We now analyze whether a state-dependent regulation of the
second tree can solve this dilemma.
We examine an economy in which the margins of tree 2 are only regulated for positive-
growth shocks 5 and 6 while they are endogenously determined for the remaining four
shocks. Figure 3.9 shows that the return volatilities of both trees are monotonically de-
creasing in the margin requirement imposed on the regulated tree 2 in good shocks. Not
only does increasing the regulated margin now reduce the volatilities of both assets, but, in
fact, it does reduce aggregate market volatility much more than in the economy with state-
independent regulation. For instance, an increase of state-dependent margin requirements
from 0.6 to 0.7 on tree 2 decreases aggregate volatility by about 4.5% (see Figure 3.9),
while such an increase would bring about a reduction of only 2% in the case of state-
independent regulation (see Figure 3.7). Therefore, concerning the regulation of margin
requirements, the result from the single-tree economy is strongly confirmed by the analysis
of the two-tree economy: regulation is much more efficient at reducing price volatility, if it
is state-dependent.
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Figure 3.9: Volatility as a Function of the Margin Requirement on Tree 2 in Booms
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3.5 Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions
As in any quantitative study, our results above hinge on the parametrization of the econ-
omy. In this section, we first discuss how our results change with other preference param-
eters. Then we highlight the important role of the disaster shocks for our quantitative
results. Finally, we present an example which has less severe disaster shocks but neverthe-
less exhibits strong quantitative effects of collateral constraints.
3.5.1 Different Preferences in the Baseline Model
As a robustness check for the results in our baseline model (with one tree and one bond)
from Section 3, we consider different specifications for the IES, the coefficients of risk
aversion, and the discount factor, β. Obviously, changes in the IES and the risk aversion
coefficients affect the risk-free rate. For these cases, we also examine specifications with
an adjusted β so that the risk-free rates remain comparable. Table 3.6 reports asset-
price moments for several different combinations of these parameters. For convenience, we
repeat the results for our baseline model, (IES,RA, β) = ((1.5, 1.5), (0.5, 6), (0.95, 0.95)),
and report them as the case (P1). For each model specification, we also report the standard
deviation of returns for the benchmark case B1: No bonds.
In case (P2), a model in which both agents have an IES of 0.5, the tree return volatility
is considerably lower than in the baseline case (P1). However, it is still much higher
than in an economy with the same preferences but without borrowing, see column B1 of
(P2). We checked this result for other values of the IES below 1.5 and always observed
(IES1, IES2), (RA1, RA2), (β1, β2) Std returns Risk-free rate EP Std in B1
(P1): (1.5,1.5),(0.5,6),(0.95,0.95) 8.14 1.10 3.86 5.33
(P2): (0.5,0.5),(0.5,6),(0.95,0.95) 7.20 1.75 4.18 5.33
(P3): (1.5,1.5),(0.5,6),(0.92,0.92) 7.70 4.07 3.77 5.51
(P4): (1.5,1.5),(0.5,6),(0.98,0.98) 8.57 -1.17 3.95 5.23
(P5): (1.5,1.5),(0.5,10),(0.95,0.95) 10.79 -8.58 12.55 5.34
(P6): (1.5,1.5),(0.5,10),(0.81,0.81) 8.50 1.25 13.36 6.24
(P7): (1.5,1.5),(0.5,4),(0.95,0.95) 6.58 1.59 4.22 5.34
(P8): (1.5,1.5),(0.5,4),(0.98,0.98) 6.97 1.18 1.73 5.22
Table 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis for Preferences (all Reported Figures in Percent)
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the same phenomenon: Volatility effects are qualitatively similar but quantitatively less
pronounced.5
Next we consider a change in the discount factor β. For the benchmark case B1, a higher
β decreases return volatility simply because it decreases levels of returns and we report
absolute volatility as opposed to the coefficient of variation. The effects in our model
with one tree and one bond are quite different. As β increases from 0.95 in our baseline
case (P1) to 0.98 in (P4), the return volatility increases from 8.14 to 8.47. The reason
for this increase is simple. As β increases and the stock becomes more expensive, it is
more difficult for agent 1 to buy a significant portion of the stock when he is in financial
difficulties. This fact depresses the price of the stock when agent 1 is poor. Changes in the
wealth distribution are large when agent 1 is fully leveraged and lead now to larger swings
in the tree price.
In light of the intuition that we developed for the baseline case in Section 3.3, we expect
an increase in the risk aversion of agent 2 to lead to both a higher price volatility and a
higher equity premium. This intuition is strongly confirmed by the comparison of (P1)
and (P5). However, the increase in the second agent’s risk aversion also leads to a large
reduction of the interest rate to unrealistically low levels. In (P6) we recalibrate the
model to obtain a positive interest rate and we find that the previously described effect
of a smaller β dampens the impact of a higher risk aversion. But still, overall volatility
increases substantially once the risk aversion and β are changed simultaneously: For risk
aversions of 4, 6, and 10, (cases (P8), (P1) and (P6)) the return volatility is 6.97, 8.14,
and 8.50 respectively.
3.5.2 Endowments
As we have seen repeatedly in our analysis, our model produces asset pricing moments
that are comparable to observed values in the data. Clearly, this nice feature of our model
depends on the magnitude of the disaster shocks. We now report results for models with
less severe disaster shocks and demonstrate that the results remain qualitatively the same.
We conduct two different types of sensitivity analysis for our shock process. First, in the
5For low values of the IES, there is an additional unwanted effect. As one agent holds most of the
wealth (that is, as the other agent becomes poor), asset prices increase because of the desire of the rich
agent to save. This effect on the boundary of the state space is absent when the IES is set to 1.5 which
we, therefore, do for the remainder of our analysis.
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Std returns Risk-free rate Equity-premium Std in B1
Case (E1) 5.95 3.44 2.17 4.15
Case (E2) 3.92 5.97 0.36 3.51
Table 3.7: Sensitivity Analysis for Endowments (all Figures are in Percent)
case (E1) we hold the magnitude of the disaster shocks constant, but reduce the overall
probability of a disaster by 50 percent. Instead of setting the probabilities of shocks 1, 2,
and 3 to 0.005, 0.005, and 0.024, respectively, we set them at 0.0025, 0.0025, and 0.012,
respectively, and increase the probability of shock 5 accordingly. Secondly, in the case (E2)
we leave the probabilities of the shocks unchanged but shift their support. In particular,
we replace the growth rates in shocks 1, 2, and 3 of 0.566, 0.717, and 0.867, respectively,
by the new values of 0.783, 0.8585, and 0.9335, respectively. Table 3.7 shows the analogue
of Table 3.6 for these two cases. The table shows that a decrease in the probability of
disaster has a relatively small effect on volatility while a change in the support has quite a
large effect. As we explained above, the disaster states play two roles in our model. First,
they lead to high excess returns of the tree, in particular whenever the risk-averse agent 2
must hold the tree. Secondly, they lead to endogenously high margin requirements. As we
decrease the probability of disaster, the second effect remains unchanged. In contrast, the
change in the support of the disaster shocks mitigates both effects above.
3.5.3 Large Effects with Smaller Shocks
The results for the case (E2) above show that the quantitative impact of collateral con-
straints depends heavily on the size of the disaster shocks. However, we now demonstrate
that even with halved disaster shocks as in (E2), there are still substantial effects. For this
purpose, we consider the model with two trees where tree 1 is collateralizable and tree 2 is
not, and assume that agent 1’s risk aversion is 10. We recalibrate the discount factor β to
be 0.98, which results in a risk-free rate of 1.94. Table 3.8 shows that aggregate volatility
with collateral constraints is now 48% higher than in the benchmark B1. This increase
is of similar magnitude as in the baseline model. The high aggregate volatility is mostly
driven by the volatility of tree 2, which increases by 95% compared to this benchmark.
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Std returns EP Std returns agg Risk-free rate EP agg Std in B1
Tree 1 4.41 0.77
5.05 1.94 1.02 3.42
Tree 2 6.68 1.65
Table 3.8: Moments of Trees’ Returns (Tree 1 Collateralizable, Tree 2 not)
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that collateral and margin requirements play a quantitatively im-
portant role for prices of long-lived assets. This is true even for assets that cannot be
used as collateral. In fact, somewhat surprisingly, we show that the presence of collateral
constraints has a larger effect on the volatility of non-collateralizable assets than on the
underlying collateral.
The recent financial crisis has lead researchers to suggest that central banks should regu-
late collateral requirements, see, for example, Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010) or
Geanakoplos (2009). We show that tightening margins uniformly over the business cycle
can increase the price volatility of the underlying collateral but typically decreases price
volatility of other long-lived assets in the economy that are not directly affected by the
regulation. The only policy to achieve a decrease of the price volatility of all assets is to
tighten margins only in boom times but leave them to market forces in recessions or crises.
Our calibration assumes the presence of disaster shocks as in Barro (2009). We provide
alternative parameterizations of preferences and endowments under which our main qual-
itative results continue to hold.
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Appendix
3.A Details on Computations
The algorithm used to solve all versions of the model is based on Brumm and Grill (2010).
Equilibrium policy functions are computed by iterating on the period-to-period equilibrium
conditions, which are transformed into a system of equations. We use KNITRO to solve
this system of equations for each grid point. Policy functions are approximated by piecewise
linear functions. By using fractions of financial wealth as the endogenous state variables,
the dimension of the state space is equal to the number of agents minus one. Hence
with two agents, the model has an endogenous state space of one dimension only. This
makes computations much easier than in Brumm and Grill (2010), where two and three
dimensional problems are solved. In particular, in one dimension reasonable accuracy may
be achieved without adapting the grid to the kinks. For the reported results we used 320
or 640 grid points depending on the complexity of the version of the model, which results
in average (relative) Euler errors with order of magnitude 10−4, while maximal errors are
about ten times higher. If the number of gridpoints is increased to a few thousands, then
Euler errors fall about one order of magnitude. However, the considered moments only
change by about 0.1 percent. Hence, using 320 or 640 points provides a solution which is
precise enough for our purposes. Compared to other models the ratio of Euler errors to
the number of grid points used might seem large. However, note that due to the number
of assets and inequality constraints our model is numerically much harder to handle than
standard models. For example, in the version with one tree and five bonds, eleven assets
are needed (as long and short positions in bonds have to the treated as separate assets)
and we have to impose eleven inequality constraints per agent.
3.B Equilibrium Conditions
We state the equilibrium equations as we implemented them in Matlab for economies with
a single tree and a single bond. For our computation of financial markets equilibria we
normalized all variables by the aggregate endowment e¯. To simplify the notation, we drop
the dependence on the date-event st and, in an abuse of notation, denote the normalized
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parameters and variables by et, dt and ct, qt, pt, rt, ft, respectively. Similarly, we normalize
both the objective function and the budget constraint of agents’ utility maximization
problem. The resulting maximization problem is then as follows (index h is dropped).
max ut(ct) =
{
(ct)
ρ + β [E (ut+1gt+1)
α]
ρ
α
} 1
ρ
s.t. 0 = ct + φtpt + θtqt − et − [φt−1]
+ rt
gt
+ [φt−1]
−ft
gt
− θt−1 (qt + dt)
0 ≤ θt + kt[φt]
−, 0 ≤ [φt]
+, [φt]
− ≤ 0,
The latter two inequalities are imposed because, for the computations, we treat the long and
short position in the bond, [φt]
+ and [φt]
−, as separate assets. Note that φt = [φt]
++[φt]
−.
Let λt denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. The first-order condition
with respect to ct is as follows,
0 = (ut)
1−ρ(ct)
ρ−1 − λt.
Next we state the first-order condition with respect to ct+1.
0 = βu1−ρt [E (ut+1gt+1)
α]
ρ−α
α (ut+1gt+1)
α−1 gt+1(ut+1)
1−ρ(ct+1)
ρ−1 − λt+1.
Below we need the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers,
λt+1
λt
= β [E (ut+1gt+1)
α]
ρ−α
α (ut+1)
α−ρ(gt+1)
α
(
ct+1
ct
)ρ−1
Let µt denote the multiplier for the collateral constraint and let µˆt =
µt
λt
. We divide the
first-order condition with respect to θt,
0 = −λtqt + µt + E (λt+1 (qt+1 + dt+1))
by λt and obtain the equation
0 = −qt + µˆt + β [E (ut+1gt+1)
α]
ρ−α
α E
(
(ut+1)
α−ρ(gt+1)
α
(
ct+1
ct
)ρ−1
(qt+1 + dt+1)
)
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Similarly, the first-order conditions for [φt]
+ and [φt]
− are as follows,
0 = −pt + ν
+
t + β [E (ut+1gt+1)
α]
ρ−α
α E
(
(ut+1)
α−ρ(gt+1)
α
(
ct+1
ct
)ρ−1(
rt+1
gt+1
))
0 = −pt + µˆtkt − ν
−
t + β [E (ut+1gt+1)
α]
ρ−α
α E
(
(ut+1)
α−ρ(gt+1)
α
(
ct+1
ct
)ρ−1(
ft+1
gt+1
))
,
where ν+t and ν
−
t denote the multipliers on 0 ≤ [φt]
+ and [φt]
− ≤ 0, respectively.
Chapter 4
Computing Equilibria in Models with
Occasionally Binding Constraints
4.1 Introduction
In many applications of dynamic stochastic (general) equilibrium models, it is a natural
modeling choice to include constraints that are occasionally binding. Examples are models
with borrowing constraints, liquidity constraints, a zero bound on the nominal interest
rate, or irreversible investments. These constraints induce non-differentiabilities in the
policy functions, which make it challenging to compute equilibria. In particular, standard
interpolation techniques using non-adaptive grids perform poorly both in terms of accuracy
and shape of the computed policy function (see, e.g. Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003),
pp.270-1). This paper proposes a method that overcomes these problems, even for models
with several continuous state variables. We call this method Adaptive Simplicial Interpo-
lation (ASI). Its working principle is to locate the non-differentiabilities that are induced
by occasionally binding constraints, and to put additional interpolation nodes there.
We present our algorithm in the setting of a dynamic endowment economy where three or
four (types of) agents face aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. To explain the main features
of ASI we first compute equilibria in a simple two period version where agents trade in
a bond subject to an ad-hoc borrowing constraint. Second, we embed ASI into a time
iteration algorithm to solve an infinite horizon version of the model. Finally, we add a Lu-
cas tree-type stock, which is subject to a short sale constraint, and we replace the ad-hoc
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borrowing constraint by a collateral constraint. Consequently, short positions in the bond
need to be collateralized by stock holdings, while the stock may not be shorted.
Compared to earlier papers using a similar setup, such as Heaton and Lucas (1996), den
Haan (2001) or Kubler and Schmedders (2003), the models we consider differ in two re-
spects, which both make it harder to compute equilibria: First, we solve models with more
agents, which results in a continuous state space of higher dimension. As the kinks1 natu-
rally form hypersurfaces in the state space, they are of higher dimension as well. Second, in
our extension, the trading constraints that agents face depend on tomorrow’s equilibrium
price of the stock, which is endogenously determined. Consequently, it is much harder to
locate the kink and ad hoc methods fail.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the working principle of ASI. The dashed line displays a simple one-
dimensional policy function with a kink. Suppose this function is approximated by linear
interpolation between equidistant grid points. The resulting interpolated policy is dis-
played as a solid line in the left hand side of Figure 1. Clearly, the approximation error
is comparatively large around the kink, and this is just because there is no interpolation
node near the kink. If we knew the location of the kink and put a node there, then the
approximation would be much better, as the right hand side of Figure 4.1 shows. This is
the motivation for ASI, which directly addresses the problem of kinks in policy functions
by placing additional grid points, called adapted points, at these non-differentiabilities.
Clearly, in higher dimensional state spaces and with complex constraints, this approach is
not as simple as Figure 4.1 suggests. Hence, we need a flexible interpolation technique and
a systematic adaptation procedure.
To be able to place grid points wherever needed, we use Delaunay interpolation, which
consists of two steps. First, the convex hull of the set of grid points is covered with sim-
plices, which results in a so-called tessellation. Then we linearly interpolate locally on each
simplex.2
We adapt the grid as follows: First, we solve the system of equilibrium conditions on an
1In our terminology, a kink associated with a certain constraint is the set of points at which the policy
function fails to be differentiable because the constraint is just binding, i.e. the constraint is binding and
the associated multiplier is zero.
2Clearly, linear simplicial interpolation is only C0 at the boundaries. For our purposes, this is desirable,
because it provides a better fit at the kinks, and it ensures stability of the time iteration algorithm.
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Figure 4.1: Non-Adaptive (lhs) and Adaptive (rhs) Linear Interpolation in 1D
initial grid. Second, we use these solutions to determine which edges of the tessellation
cross kinks. Third, on each of these edges, we solve a modified system of equilibrium con-
ditions to determine the point of intersection with the kink. Finally, we place a new grid
point there. Using this procedure with state spaces of more than one dimension, we get
several adapted grid points for each kink. Delaunay tessellation connects these points by
edges, such that the kinks are matched very accurately.
To solve the above described infinite horizon models, we embed adaptive simplicial inter-
polation in a standard time iteration algorithm (see, e.g. Judd (1998)). To assess the
accuracy of the computed equilibria, we follow Judd (1992) in calculating relative errors in
Euler equations, subsequently called Euler errors. Concerning the measured Euler errors,
we find that our method accurately computes equilibria for the two economies considered,
both for reasonable and extreme calibrations of our model. Furthermore, we assess the rel-
ative performance of the adaptive grid scheme by comparing it to a standard equidistant
grid scheme using the same interpolation technique. We find that the adaptive grid scheme
dominates by far: One needs to increase the number of equidistant grid points, and thereby
CPU time, by more than two orders of magnitude in order to reach the high accuracy of
the adaptive grid scheme. Finally, we demonstrate that ad hoc update procedures that
place additional points near the kinks are much less efficient than ASI.
In the literature, many algorithms have been applied to dynamic models with occasion-
ally binding constraints. However, none of the existing algorithms addresses the problems
of non-differentiabilities directly. Christiano and Fisher (2000) compare how several algo-
rithms compute equilibria in a one sector growth model with irreversible investment, which
has only one continuous state variable. None of the applied algorithms uses an adaptive
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grid scheme. A grid structure which is not adaptive, but endogenous, is proposed by Car-
rol (2006) and extended by Barillas and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2007), Rendahl (2007), and
Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010). This so called endogenous grid method defines a grid on
tomorrow’s variables, resulting in an endogenous grid on today’s variables. Its major ad-
vantage is that it avoids the root finding step. However, as it exploits the specific mapping
from next period’s variables to today’s variables, the applicability as well as the concrete
implementation of this method depends very much on details of the model. Maybe most
related to our paper, Grune and Semmler (2004) propose an adaptive grid scheme for solv-
ing dynamic programming problems. However, this method is designed for value function
iteration, it interpolates on rectangular elements, and uses estimated local errors of the
value function to update the grid. Along all these dimensions their method is orthogonal
to our algorithm. The sparse grid Smolyak (1963) algorithm is a well known approach to
high-dimensional interpolation in economics. Krueger and Kubler (2004) use it to compute
equilibria in OLG models with state spaces that have up to 30 dimensions. Certainly, this
cannot be achieved in feasible time with our algorithm. However, the Smolyak algorithm
requires policy functions to be smooth, which is not the case in models with occasionally
binding constraints.
Section 4.2 presents adaptive simplicial interpolation, which consists of two components:
Delaunay interpolation and an adaptive grid scheme. The example used to explain ASI is
a two period exchange economy where several types of agents trade in a bond subject to
ad-hoc borrowing constraints. Section 4.3 shows how the infinite horizon version of this
economy is solved by embedding ASI in a time iteration setup. In Section 4.4, ASI is
applied to a model where trade in a bond and a stock is subject to collateral constraints
and short-selling constraints. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 examine carefully the computational
performance of ASI as to the respective models. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Adaptive Simplicial Interpolation
The main innovation of this paper is ASI, which is tailor-made for interpolating policy
functions in models with occasionally binding constraints. Section 4.2.1 gives a simple
example of such a model: An exchange economy where heterogeneous agents trade in a
one-period bond subject to ad-hoc borrowing constraints. Section 4.2.2 provides a formal
characterization of the problems we are considering. Section 4.2.3 outlines the adaptive
simplicial interpolation algorithm we propose, while Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 describe the
two essential ingredients of the method: a simplicial interpolation technique based on
Delaunay tessellation, and an adaptive grid scheme. Finally, Section 4.2.6 illustrates the
workings of ASI with the help of the simple example from Section 4.2.1.
4.2.1 Simple Example: Borrowing Constraints
The Bond Economy
The economy is populated by H types of agents h ∈ H = {1, . . . , H} living for T periods.
Agents have identical preferences3, but differ with respect to endowment realizations. They
maximize expected time-separable lifetime utility
E
[
T∑
t=1
βt
c1−γt
1− γ
]
,
where ct denotes consumption at t, β is the time discount factor, and γ is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion.
Uncertainty is captured by a first-order Markov process with domain X = {1, ..., K}.
Aggregate endowment of the single consumption good is given by a time invariant function
e¯ : X → R++, which depends on the current shock only. Similarly, agent h’s individual
endowment is given by eh : X → R++.
Each period, agents trade in a one-period bond, which is in zero net supply. Hence, agents
face the following budget constraints:
cht + b
h
t pt ≤ e
h
t + b
h
t−1 ∀t = 1, . . . , T ∀h ∈ H,
3Allowing for heterogeneous preferences does not impede using ASI.
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where bht denotes the bond holding that agent h acquires at time t, and pt denotes the
respective price. Moreover, agents face an ad-hoc borrowing constraint:
bt ≥ b ∀t = 1, . . . , T,
where b ∈ R−.
State Space
The state of the economy at the beginning of a period is characterized by the exogenous
shock and the asset distribution among agents. Because of bond market clearing, we may
use the bond holdings of H − 1 agents as the endogenous state variable:
yt =
(
b1t−1, . . . , b
H−1
t−1
)
.
Assuming that last period’s constraints of all agents were satisfied, agent h enters period
t with bond holding restricted by
bht−1 ∈ [b,−(H − 1)b] .
Hence, we take the endogenous state space to be
Y ≡
{
y ∈ [b,−(H − 1)b]H−1
∣∣∣∣∣
H−1∑
i=1
yi ∈ [b,−(H − 1)b]
}
.
The whole state space S is then given by the product of the exogenous part and the
endogenous part, i.e.
S = X × Y.
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Equilibrium Conditions
The endogenous choices and prices in period t are:
zt ≡
({
cht , b
h
t
}
h∈H
, pt
)
.
We call the collection of these endogenous variables policies, and denote the space of policies
by Z.
The definition of competitive equilibrium is standard and given in Appendix 4.A, where we
also derive the first order necessary conditions for equilibrium. Here, we just state these
conditions. Along an equilibrium path, policies satisfy market clearing in the bond market,
budget constraints, Euler equations, borrowing constraints and complementary slackness
conditions4:
∑
h∈H
bht = 0,
cht + b
h
t pt − e
h
t − b
h
t−1 = 0 ∀h ∈ H,
−u′(cht )p+ µ
h
t + E
[
βu′(cht+1)
]
= 0 ∀h ∈ H,
0 ≤ bht − b ⊥ µ
h
t ≥ 0 ∀h ∈ H,
where µh denotes the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the borrowing constraint of agent h.
4The sign ⊥ denotes orthogonality of two vectors. Hence, for a, b ∈ Rn:
a⊥b :⇔
n∑
k=1
akbk = 0.
If a, b ≥ 0, then a⊥b implies that for each coordinate k = 1, . . . , n either ak = 0, bk = 0, or both. Hence,
0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 is equivalent to
∀k = 1, . . . , n : 0 ≤ ak ∧ 0 ≤ bk ∧ ( ak = 0 ∨ bk = 0 ) .
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Two Period Version
Now consider the simplest dynamic setting: T = 2. In this case there is no trade in the
second period and agents simply consume all their funds:
ch2 = e
h
2 + b
h
1 .
Consequently, in period one, equilibrium conditions for given initial bond holdings {bh0}h∈H
simplify to:
∑
h∈H
bh1 = 0,
ch1 + b
h
1p1 − e
h
1 − b
h
0 = 0 ∀h ∈ H,
−u′(cht )p1 + µ
h
1 + E
[
βu′(eh2 + b
h
1)
]
= 0 ∀h ∈ H,
0 ≤ bh1 − b ⊥ µ
h
1 ≥ 0 ∀h ∈ H.
4.2.2 The General Problem
The above problem of finding an equilibrium policy for the two period bond economy with
given initial bond holdings has the following structure:
Equilibrium Problem:
Given a state s ∈ S , and functions
φ : S × Rm+n → Rm, ψ : S × Rm → Rn,
find policies and multipliers (z, µ) ∈ Rm × Rn,
s.t. φ(s, z, µ) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ(s, z) ⊥ µ ≥ 0.
In the case of our example, the equations φ = 0 contain market clearing, budget con-
straints, and Euler equations. The inequalities 0 ≤ ψ contain the borrowing constrains,
and µ contains the respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. To solve such a problem for a
given state s, there are many well established procedures. Either one applies solvers that
accept complementarity conditions, or one transforms these conditions into equations—as
explained in Appendix 4.C—and applies standard non-linear equation solvers.
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However, things get more involved, if one is interested in the mapping from the state of
the economy, s, into choices and prices, f(s). Then, one faces a parametric problem, with
the state of the economy, s, being the parameter.
Parametric Equilibrium Problem:
Given φ : S × Rm+n → Rm, ψ : S × Rm → Rn,
find f : S → Rm, µ : S → Rn,
s.t. ∀s ∈ S: φ(s, f(s), µ(s)) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ(s, f(s)) ⊥ µ(s) ≥ 0.
One way to compute functions (f, µ) that approximately satisfy these conditions is collo-
cation (see, e.g. Judd (1998)): choose a finite grid G ⊂ S, on which the above conditions
have to be satisfied precisely, i.e. require
∀g ∈ G: φ(g, f(g), µ(g)) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ(g, f(g)) ⊥ µ(g) ≥ 0.
For each point on the grid, g ∈ G, the solution f(g) is determined by solving a com-
plementarity problem. Aside from the grid G, collocation determines f by interpolating
the solutions {f(g)}g∈G found on the grid. Clearly, this does not result in a perfect fit,
and more importantly, the quality of the fit depends crucially on the location of the grid
points g ∈ G. In particular, if there are kinks in the function f , it is desirable to put grid
points there, because any method that interpolates over the kink has no chance to match
it exactly.
In general, f is non-differentiable at the points k where for some j both ψj(k, f(k)) and
µj(k) are equal to zero. The reason is as follows: ψj(k, f(k)) = 0 means that this constraint
is binding, and µj(k) = 0 means that the associated multiplier is zero though. Loosely
speaking, the constraint is binding at one side and non-binding at the other side of the
point. In general, this implies that the optimal solution is determined by different sets of
equations on the two sides of the point, resulting in different slopes of the policy function.
All in all, the above reasoning suggests that we should put interpolation nodes at points
where constraints are just binding. We achieve this using the algorithm presented in Sec-
tions 4.2.3 to 4.2.5.
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4.2.3 The Algorithm
To solve the parametric equilibrium problem presented above, we propose Adaptive Sim-
plicial Interpolation. An overview of this procedure is given below. Steps two and three
are black boxes for now. Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 explain these steps in detail. We will
explain Delaunay interpolation first, as it includes the concept of tessellation, which we
use in the grid adaptation procedure.
Adaptive Simplicial Interpolation:
1. Initialization:
Start with an initial grid Ginit and solve for the solutions {f(g)}g∈Ginit using standard
numerical procedures.
2. Grid Adaptation:
Use the solutions {f(g)}g∈Ginit , as explained in Section 4.2.5, to solve jointly for
adapted grid points Gadapt that lie directly on the kinks and for the solutions
{f(k)}k∈Gadapt at these points.
3. Simplicial Interpolation:
Interpolate f on G = Ginit ∪Gadapt. To interpolate on a grid with such an irregular
shape, use simplicial interpolation, namely Delaunay interpolation, which is explained
in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.4 Delaunay Interpolation
To get as much flexibility as possible in adapting the collocation grid, we need to have
a method that is able to interpolate between points from any arbitrary set of scattered
points. In addition, we require the method to work in arbitrary dimensions. Delaunay
interpolation fulfills both criteria. This interpolation technique consists of two main steps:
First, the state space is divided into simplices, which is done by Delaunay tessellation.
Second, simplicial interpolation interpolates locally on these simplices.
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Figure 4.2: Set of Grid Points (lhs) and its Delaunay Triangulation (rhs)
Delaunay Tessellation
In computational geometry, Delaunay tessellation5 is a well established method to cover
the convex hull of an arbitrary set of points with simplices. For the sake of simplicity,
we explain Delaunay tessellation for the two dimensional case. In this case, the simplices
are just triangles and the method is called triangulation. In Figure 4.2, the left hand
side picture shows a set of scattered grid points. The right hand side picture shows the
Delaunay triangulation of this set of grid points. Delaunay triangulation is just one possible
way to triangulate a set of grid points. However, it imposes discipline on the triangulation
by satisfying the following property: inside the circumcircle of any triangle there is no
point from the set of points. To make sense of this requirement, note that: by definition,
the vertices of a triangle lie on its circumcircle, and in a Delaunay triangulation other
points might as well lie on this circumcircle but not inside. Simpson (1978) shows that this
procedure maximizes the minimum angle among all angles within the triangulation. Hence,
it avoids pointed triangles. From a numerical perspective, this is a convenient property,
since it implies that the information used to interpolate at a particular point stems from
points that are relatively nearby. For a more extensive discussion of Delaunay Tessellation,
see de Berg, Cheong, van Kreveld, and Overmars (2008).
5Delaunay tessellation was introduced by Delaunay (1934) and is well known in engineering. However,
up to our knowledge, it has never been used to compute equilibria in dynamic models.
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Simplicial Interpolation
Having the tessellation of a set of points at hand, linear simplicial interpolation is straight-
forward: For any arbitrary point, find the simplex it is contained in. Then calculate its
barycentric coordinates within this simplex. Finally, the interpolation value is just a linear
combination of the values at the corners of the simplex. The weights are given by the
barycentric coordinates of the corners.
4.2.5 An Adaptive Grid Scheme
Let us now turn to the process of adapting the grid. Our aim is to detect kinks and place
points on these kinks in order to match them precisely. In terms of the notation of Section
4.2.2, we want to determine points that lie on
K = {s| ∃j ψj(s, f(s)) = 0 and µj(s) = 0}.
Hence, we are looking for points where a constraint holds with equality but the respective
multiplier is zero, i.e. where the constraint is just binding. To determine such points we
proceed as follows.
How to Determine Which Edges Cross Kinks
To determine the location of kinks, we use the solutions {f(g)} computed on the initial grid
Ginit. Clearly, if ψj(g, f(g)) = 0, we know that this constraint, which we call constraint j,
is binding at g. Otherwise it is not binding. Furthermore, we make use of the tessellation
of the initial grid. We consider each edge of the tessellation and check whether constraint
j is binding at one corner and non-binding at the other corner of this edge. If this is the
case, we conclude that the associated kink, which we call kink j, crosses this edge. In this
way, we find sets of edges {Ej} crossing the kinks j = 1, . . . ,m.
How to Put Points Exactly on the Kink
Given the sets of edges {Ej} crossing the kinks j = 1, . . . ,m, we need to determine where
exactly to put points on these edges. For each individual edge E ∈ Ej this is done by
solving a modified version of the equation system that characterizes equilibrium. The key
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conceptional difference is that we let the state variable vary on the edge and do not solve
the equation system at a given point in the state space. To pin down the one point that lies
on the kink, we force that both ψj and µj are equal to zero. Hence, we solve jointly for the
equilibrium solution and for a point in the state space on which the equilibrium solution
fulfills a certain requirement, namely that the considered constraint is just binding. More
formally, we solve for the point k, policies z, and multipliers µ such that:
φ(k, z, µ) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ−j(k, z) ⊥ µ−j ≥ 0,
ψj(k, z) = 0, µj = 0,
k ∈ E.
By demanding ψj(k, z) = 0, µj = 0 instead of 0 ≤ ψj(k, z) ⊥ µj ≥ 0, we reduce the
degrees of freedom by one. But letting the state variable k vary on the one-dimensional
object E, in contrast to fixing a point in the state space, increases the degrees of freedom
by one. Hence, the modified equation system has a (locally unique) solution (k, z, µ), if
(z, µ) is a (locally unique) solution to the original equation system at k. This solution does
not only provide the point k that lies on the kink, but at the same time it provides the
optimal policy at this point, namely f(k) = z.
In this way—for all edges E in all sets Ej—we compute points k and policies f(k). We
call these points adaptive, and denote the set containing them by Gadapt. Finally, we add
them to the initial points to generate the adapted grid: G = Ginit ∪Gadapt.
6
4.2.6 ASI at Work
Figure 4.3 visualizes the working principle of ASI. The left hand side displays an initial
grid for a given exogenous state of the 2-period bond economy. On the x-axis we have
wealth of agent 1, on the y-axis wealth of agent 2—remember that the wealth of agent
3 is given by market clearing. We place 15 equidistant grid points on this state space,
and we solve the equilibrium problem on this initial grid. Knowing the optimal policies
at these points, we now consider each constraint at a time. We start with the borrowing
6Instead of this fine tuned adaptation procedure, one could also use a rather mechanical update of the
grid. Instead of locating the kink exactly, one could just add arbitrary points into the triangles of interest,
e.g. the center point of the triangle or say 5 randomly distributed points. This is easier to program, but
comes at the cost of a less accurate result.
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Figure 4.3: Initial Grid (lhs) and Adapted Grid (rhs) Using ASI in 2D
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Figure 4.4: 2D Policy with ASI (lhs) and 1D Slice with and without ASI (rhs)
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constraint of agent 1. In the left picture, black dots indicate that the constraint of agent 1
is binding, while white dots indicate that it is not binding. Hence, we know on which edges
of the triangulation the constraint change from binding to non-binding. On these edges,
we apply the second part of our adaptation scheme: we solve the modified equation system
that allows us to find the particular point on the edge where the constraint is just binding
(e.g. where the kink crosses the edge). Doing this for all relevant edges, we end up with
8 adapted points in this example, which are displayed in the right picture in Figure 4.3.
Finally, a new triangulation is computed for the set of all grid points, initial and adapted.
After this, we consider the next constraint. However, all other constraints are always non
binding in this simple example. Hence, there are no further points to be added. Note that
the new triangulation connects the adapted points by edges, thus kinks are matched very
accurately. This can also be seen in Figure 4.4, where the left graph shows the equilibrium
bond demand function of agent 1. The range where agent 1 is constrained by the borrowing
limit is displayed by the dark shaded area. The kink induced by the inequality constraint
is well approximated by the adapted points. The solid line in the right graph displays a
slice of the bond demand function of agent 1. The dashed line represents the policy one
gets if an equidistant grid is used. Clearly, this policy is quite inaccurate at the kink.
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4.3 Time Iteration with ASI
We now consider the infinite horizon version of the bond economy from section 4.2.1.
Section 4.3.1 characterizes recursive equilibrium policies for this model. Section 4.3.2 shows
how such policies may be computed by embedding ASI into a standard time iteration setup.
Details of how we implement this algorithm are given in Section 4.3.3. Finally, Section
4.3.4 analyzes the computational performance of time iteration with ASI.
4.3.1 The Infinite Horizon Bond Economy
Consider the bond economy of Section 4.2.1 with T =∞. We want to describe equilibrium
in terms of policy functions that map the current state into current policies:
ft : S → Z, ft :
(
xt,
(
b1t−1, . . . , b
H−1
t−1
))
7→
({
cht , b
h
t
}
h∈H
, pt
)
.
For the components of the policy function, we use the same notation as for their values,
hence
ft =
({
cht , b
h
t
}
h∈H
, pt
)
.
For all states, these functions {ft} have to satisfy the period-to-period first order equilib-
rium conditions (see Appendix 4.A):
∀s :
∑
h∈H
bh(s) = 0,
cht (s) + b
h
t (s)pt(s)− e
h
t (s)− b
h
t−1(s) = 0, ∀h ∈ H,
−u′(cht (s))pt(s) + µ
h
t (s) + E
[
βu′
(
cht+1 (st+1)
)]
= 0, ∀h ∈ H,
0 ≤ bht (s)− b ⊥ µ
h
t (s) ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H,
where st+1 =
(
xt+1,
(
b1t , . . . , b
H−1
t
))
.
A recursive equilibrium policy function of this economy is a time invariant policy function
f that satisfies these conditions, i.e. the sequence {ft} with ft = f ∀t satisfies the above
conditions.
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4.3.2 The Algorithm
The above period-to-period equilibrium conditions have the following structure:
∀s : φ[fnext] (s, f(s), µ(s)) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ (s, f(s)) ⊥ µ(s) ≥ 0,
where time t variables have no index, and the policy in t + 1 is denoted by fnext. The
equations φ[fnext] = 0, which depend on fnext, contain market clearing, budget constraints
and Euler equations. Only the latter depend on fnext—in this case on the consumption
policies only. The inequalities 0 ≤ ψ contain the borrowing constraints, and µ contains the
respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. A recursive equilibrium policy function f satisfies:
∀s : φ[f ] (s, f(s), µ(s)) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ (s, f(s)) ⊥ µ(s) ≥ 0.
The problem of finding a policy function that (approximately) satisfies this condition is very
hard to address directly. In a time iteration procedure, the recursive equilibrium policy
function is approximated iteratively: in each step, a simpler problem is solved, where
next period’s policy, fnext, is taken as given. This brings us back to the period-to-period
equilibrium conditions:
∀s : φ[fnext] (s, f(s), µ(s)) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ (s, f(s)) ⊥ µ(s) ≥ 0.
This problem takes exactly the form of the parametric equilibrium problem discussed in
Section 4.2.2. Hence, we may use adaptive simplicial interpolation for this essential step
in the time iteration algorithm. The formal structure of the full algorithm is given below.
We deviate from a standard time iteration procedure only with regard to the interpolation
procedure, which is contained in the inner box.
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Time Iteration with Adaptive Simplicial Interpolation:
1. Select a grid Ginit, an initial policy function f
init, and an error tolerance .
Set fnext ≡ f init.
2. Make one time iteration step: For all g ∈ Ginit, find f(g) that solves
φ[fnext] (s, f(s), µ(s)) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ (s, f(s)) ⊥ µ(s) ≥ 0.
Interpolate f by adaptive simplicial interpolation:
First, use the solutions {f(g)}g∈Ginit to solve jointly for adapted points Gadapt
that lie directly on kinks and for the optimal policy {f(g)}g∈Gadapt at these
points.
Second, use solutions at all grid points G = Ginit ∪ Gadapt to interpolate f by
simplicial interpolation.
If ‖f − fnext‖∞ < , go to step 3.
Else set fnext ≡ f and repeat step 2.
3. Set the numerical solution to the infinite horizon optimization problem: f˜ = f .
4.3.3 Implementation of the Algorithm
To demonstrate that our algorithm works well with standard equipment, we use Matlab
on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.40 GHz computer to implement our algorithm.
Solving the System of Equilibrium Conditions
To solve the complementarity problem at each grid point, one could use a solver that
directly applies to complementarity problems. However, we prefer to transform the com-
plementarity problem into a system of equations (see Appendix 4.C) and then apply a
standard non-linear equation solver, e.g. Matlab’s fsolve or Ziena’s Knitro. We are able
to solve our models with both solvers. However, we find that the more equations the
equlibrium system involves the better the performance of Knitro compared to fsolve.
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Adaptive Simplicial Interpolation
Our method of choice for interpolation is Delaunay interpolation as described in Section
4.2.4. Delaunay Interpolation is widely used in many areas, and hence code in several
languages like C++ or Fortran is available on the web. In Matlab, routines for computing
Delaunay tessellations and simplicial interpolation come with the standard version.
Time Iteration
For the computation exercise presented below we set the error tolerance  = 10−5. We set
the initial policy function f init such that agents consume all their wealth and the price of all
assets is equal to zero. Hence, f init corresponds to the policy function in the final period of
a finite horizon economy. This is not an efficient starting guess, but it makes the computing
times of our examples comparable. As a starting guess for solving the equilibrium problem
at a given point, we use the solution from the previous iteration. In case the solver cannot
find a root we use the solution from neighboring points as new starting guesses. In this
way we always find solutions that satisfy the error tolerance.
To decrease CPU time, we start the time iteration procedure with a relatively coarse
equidistant grid, and increase the density of the grid as the error in ‖f − fnext‖∞ falls
below  · 10. We repeat this several times until we reach a grid of certain predefined size.
In the comparison studies below, this refinement of the equidistant grid is done in exactly
the same way for the adaptive grid method and the equidistant benchmark.
To further decrease CPU time, we do not use adaptive simplicial interpolation at each
iteration step. The first step is not done until all refinements of the equidistant grid are
carried out and the error in ‖f − fnext‖∞ falls below  · 10 again. Note that kinks in policy
functions change their location along the time iteration procedure. Hence, it is important
to use a sufficient number of adaptation steps. Furthermore, note that at each adaptation
step, we compute new adapted nodes and do not use the adapted nodes from the last step
any more.
4.3.4 Computational Performance
To evaluate the computational performance of time iteration with adaptive simplicial in-
terpolation, we first report the accuracy of the computed equilibria for various examples.
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Second, we compare time iteration with ASI to two other grid structures: an equidis-
tant grid, and an ad hoc update scheme that places additional grid points randomly into
simplices that are cut by kinks.
Measuring Accuracy
Following Judd (1992) we evaluate the accuracy of a computed equilibrium by calculating
relative errors in Euler equations (EEs). An EE measures the error that an agent would
make in terms of his period-to-period consumption decision, if he used the computed pol-
icy function. The unit of measure is the relative deviation of computed (i.e. interpolated)
consumption, cintt , from the one that is optimal, c
opt
t , given next periods interpolated con-
sumption, cintt+1. To derive c
opt
t from c
int
t+1 one uses an Euler equation. For instance, in the
Bond economy of Section 4.2.1 the Euler error EEh(·) for agent h at a particular point s
in the state space is given by
EEh(s) =
∣∣∣∣copttcintt − 1
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
u′−1
(
βEt
[
u′(cintt+1)
pint
])
cintt (s)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where pint is the interpolated price of the bond today. However, it is possible to back
out coptt from c
int
t+1 only if the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier entering the Euler equation is zero,
i.e. if the respective constraint is non-binding. If it is binding, we set the Euler error
equal to zero. Because of this problem with computing Euler errors when constraints are
occasionally binding we also report an alternative error measure in Appendix 4.D.
To evaluate the accuracy of computed equilibria, we calculate the Euler errors of all agents
at many points in the state space. Concerning the choice of points, we make two alternative
choices. First, we draw 10.000 random points from a uniform distribution over the whole
state space (EE state space), and compute Euler errors for all agents at these points.
Second, we take the points reached along the equilibrium path, when the economy is
simulated for 5.000 periods (EE equilibrium path). In both cases, we report both the
maximum over all agents and points (max EE) as well as the average across points of the
maximum across agents (∅ EE). This results in four different statistics, which we all report
in log10 scale.
The examples that we consider have three or four agents and a borrowing limit of b = 0.1
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or 1.0, i.e. borrowing is restricted to 10% or 100% of average individual yearly income.
Concerning all other parameters, we choose values that are considered standard in the
literature, which we report in Appendix 4.E. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report the accuracy
measures for the three and four agent examples respectively. Maximal Euler errors over
the state space range from −3 (for three agents and b = 0.1) to −1.7 (for four agents
and b = 1.0). All errors are reasonably low, but could be improved much further by
increasing the number of initial grid points, which would in turn also increase the number
of adapted points. Generally speaking, a looser borrowing limit b and/or a greater number
of agents—which both enlarge the state space—result in higher Euler errors. In the case
of four agents, we are dealing with a three-dimensional state space, and kinks become two
dimensional objects. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5, which displays a three dimensional
grid that is adapted to a kink that lies approximately orthogonal to the horizontal axis.
Bond Economy with Three Agents
EE state space EE equilibrium path
b points time(min) max EE ∅ EE max EE ∅ EE
0.1 40(45) 0.5(0.4) -3.0(−1.2) -3.8(−2.1) -2.4(−1.2) -4.4(−2.1)
0.1 113(120) 1.1(1.0) -3.2(−1.6) -4.2(−2.8) -3.2(−1.6) -4.8(−3, 4)
1.0 185(190) 6.5(4.5) -2.1(−1.1) -3.1(−2.6) -2.2(−1.1) -3.1(−1.8)
1.0 941(946) 13(11) -3.2(−1.2) -4.2(−2.9) -3.2(−1.6) -4.8(−3.4)
Table 4.1: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
Bond Economy with Four Agents
EE state space EE equilibrium path
b points time(min) max EE ∅ EE max EE ∅ EE
0.1 112(120) 4.5(4) -2.7(−1.3) -3.3(−2.0) -2.7(−1.3) -3.9(−1.7)
1.0 914(969) 60(51) -1.7(−1.1) -2.6(−2.4) -1.8(−1.1) -2.6(−3.9)
Table 4.2: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
Comparison to Equidistant Grid
In order to assess the relative performance of ASI, we also compute equilibria on a standard
equidistant grid, but still use Delaunay interpolation. To assess the gains from using an
adaptive grid scheme, we ask the following questions: First, how do solutions on equidistant
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Figure 4.5: Adapted Grid with Three Continuous State Variables
grids compare to solutions on adaptive grids, if the same number of grid points is used?
Second, how many equidistant grid points are needed to match the accuracy of ASI?
When using the same number or slightly more points, the equidistant grid scheme is slightly
faster. However, the difference is quite small, reinforcing our claim that adapting the
grid takes very little time compared to overall computing time. More importantly, in all
examples our algorithm outperforms the standard grid scheme between one and two orders
of magnitude in terms of maximum Euler errors. This holds both for Euler errors drawn
over the whole state space and along the equilibrium path. In the first example of Table
4.1, where we compare our results to an equidistant grid with about the same number of
points, the adaptive grid yields maximum Euler errors that are about 70 times lower both
on the state space and along the equilibrium path. Regarding the average Euler error,
these factors are slightly lower but still substantial. We get these lower factors for average
Euler errors, because the adaptive grid scheme rather targets the maximum Euler error
by placing grid points on kinks, and not elsewhere in the state space. However, for two
reasons the impact on average errors is also quite substantial. First, errors at the kinks
are lowered dramatically, having a sizable effect on the average error. And second, even at
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Bond Economy with Three Agents: Match Accuracy
EE state space EE equilibrium path
b points time(min) max EE ∅ EE max EE ∅ EE
0.1 40(20301) 0.5(79) -3.0(−2.8) -4.1(−5.3) -3.0(−3.1) -4.4(−6.2)
1.0 185(21945) 6.5(300) -2.1(−1.9) -3.1(−4.4) -2.2(−1.9) -3.1(−4, 6)
Table 4.3: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
Bond Economy with Four Agents: Match Accuracy
EE state space EE equilibrium path
b points time(min) max EE ∅ EE max EE ∅ EE
0.1 112(20825) 4.5(895) -2.7(−2.0) -3.3(−3.6) -2.7(−2.1) -3.9(−4.0)
1.0 914(20825) 90(3655) -1.7(−1.1) -2.6(−3.0) -1.8(−1.1) -2.6(−1.9)
Table 4.4: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
a point located elsewhere, kinks may still play a role, because agents potentially end up
near a kink tomorrow.7
As a second exercise, we ask how many equidistant grid points are needed to get the same
maximum Euler error as with a given adapted grid. Instead of targeting the number of grid
points as above, we therefore target the maximum Euler error over the state space. For
the first example with b = 0.1, we increase the grid size by a factor of 500. Interestingly,
adaptive simplicial interpolation still outperforms the equidistant grid in terms of maximum
Euler as reported in Table 4.3. Obviously, in terms of average Euler errors, taking 500 times
more points makes a big difference, resulting in a lower error for the equidistant grid. For
b = 1.0, due to memory constraints, we cannot multiply the number of grid points by 500.
We therefore increase the grid size by a factor of 120, which yields maximum errors that
are still higher than with adaptive simplicial interpolation.
When it comes to four agents, we also find that ASI outperforms equidistant grid points
by far, as the results in Table 4.4 suggest. Trying to match the maximum Euler Error from
the ASI example, we increase the amount of grid points by a factor of 200 for b = 0.1 and
20 for b = 1.0. For both cases we find that the maximum Euler Error on the equidistant
grid is still far higher.
7At these points, the equilibrium policy functions also exhibit non-differentiabilities. These are induced
by the kinks in next period’s policy. An extension of ASI could identify these non-differentiablities as well.
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Comparison to ad hoc Update
Finally we compare the accuracy of equilibria computed with ASI to the accuracy of equi-
libria computed with an ad hoc update scheme. Using the solution from the initial grid
this scheme detects which simplices are cut by a kink. Instead of adding points exactly
on the kink as done by ASI, the ad hoc update randomly places additional grid points
into these simplices. To compare this ad hoc update scheme with ASI we now compute
equilibria for the examples considered above using the same initial grid as with ASI. As
the results in Table 4.5 and 4.6 suggest ASI outperforms such an ad hoc update, even if
we use up to 200 times more grid points.
Bond Economy with Three Agents: Comparison to ad hoc Update
EE state space EE equilibrium path
b points time(min) max EE ∅ EE max EE ∅ EE
0.1 40(8000) 0.5(40) -3.0(−1.3) -4.1(−2.7) -3.0(−2.7) -4.4(−4.5)
1.0 185(8000) 6.5(122) -2.1(−2.0) -3.1(−3, 1) -2.2(−1.9) -3.1(−4, 6)
Table 4.5: Accuracy of Adaptive grid (Grid with ad hoc Update in Brackets)
Bond Economy with Four Agents: Comparison to ad hoc Update
EE state space EE equilibrium path
b points time(min) max EE ∅ EE max EE ∅ EE
0.1 112(8000) 4.5(333) -2.7(−2.3) -3.3(−3.9) -2.7(−2.4) -3.9(−4.3)
1.0 914(20825) 90(3655) -1.7(−1.3) -2.6(−3.0) -1.8(−1.1) -2.6(−1.9)
Table 4.6: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Grid with ad hoc Update in Brackets)
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4.4 Extension: Endogenous Collateral Constraints
4.4.1 The Bond and Stock Economy
Setup
We extend the bond economy of Section 4.2.1 by introducing a Lucas tree-type stock which
is in unit net supply. It pays out a fixed fraction δ of aggregate endowment each period,
i.e. stock holders receive dividends d(x) = δ · e¯(x) per unit of the stock. Hence, aggregate
endowment is given by the sum of individual endowments and dividends, i.e.
e¯(x) =
∑
h∈H
eh(x) + d(x) ∀x ∈ X.
The Lucas tree is traded each period after dividends are paid. Each agent h buys lh shares
of the stock at a price q. Hence, agents face the following budget constraints:
cht + b
h
t pt + l
h
t qt ≤ e
h
t + b
h
t−1 + l
h
t−1 (qt + dt) ∀t = 1, . . . , T ∀h ∈ H.
Moreover, trade in the bond and the stock is subject to constraints. First, we impose a
short-selling constraint on the stock, i.e.
lht ≥ 0 ∀t = 1, . . . , T ∀h ∈ H.
In contrast to the stock, the bond may be shorted. However, only if the stock is used
as collateral. More precisely, the short position in the bond may not exceed the minimal
value—in terms of resale value plus dividends—that the stock has next period:
−bht ≤ min
xt+1∈X
{
lht (q(st+1) + d(xt+1))
}
, ∀t = 1, . . . , T ∀h ∈ H,
where tomorrow’s state is st+1 = (xt+1, yt+1). The endogenous part of the state, yt+1,
will be specified below. This constraint is motivated by a bankruptcy law which makes
it possible to seize an agents’ stock holding, but not his income. To put it differently,
all future income is exempted. As there is no further punishment for default, an agent
will default on his asset position, if and only if his portfolio has a negative value. As this
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behavior is anticipated—and we assume that default premia may not be charged—no agent
will be allowed to acquire such a portfolio, which imposes the above constraint.
State Space
With the above collateral constraint, financial wealth,
wht ≡ l
h
t−1 (q(st) + d(xt)) + b
h
t−1,
cannot go below zero. Hence, the fraction of total financial wealth that an agent holds,
yh =
wh∑
j∈Hw
j
,
is bounded between zero and one. By market clearing, we may use the fractions of financial
wealth of the first H − 1 agents as the endogenous state space:
y =
(
y1, . . . , yH−1
)
∈ Y ≡
{
y ∈ RH−1+
∣∣∣∣∣
H−1∑
i=1
yi ≤ 1
}
⊂ RH−1+ .
Finally, we define the whole state space S as the product of the exogenous part and the
endogenous part, i.e.
S = X × Y.
With this definition of the state space, reconsider the collateral constraint above, and
note that: Todays choice of any agent, through its impact on tomorrows state, influences
tomorrows price of the stock, and hence today’s collateral constraint of agent h. In this
sense, the collateral constraint is endogenous, which complicates the model considerably.
Equilibrium Conditions
The endogenous choices and prices in period t are
zt ≡
((
cht , b
h
t , l
h
t
)
h∈H
, pt, qt
)
.
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In Appendix 4.B we define competitive equilibrium and derive the first-order equilibrium
conditions of this model. Along an equilibrium path, policies have to satisfy market clearing
on both asset markets, budget constraints, Euler equations for both assets, and comple-
mentary slackness conditions for both kinds of multipliers:
∑
h∈H
bht = 0,
∑
h∈H
lht = 1,
cht + b
h
t pt + l
h
t qt − e
h
t − b
h
t−1 − l
h
t−1 (qt + dt) = 0, ∀h ∈ H,
−u′(cht )pt + µ
h + E
[
βu′(cht+1)
]
= 0, ∀h ∈ H,
−u′(cht )qt + µ
h min
xt+1∈X
{q(st+1) + d(xt+1)}+ ν
h
t + E
[
βu′(cht+1) (qt+1 + dt+1)
]
= 0, ∀h ∈ H,
0 ≤ min
xt+1∈X
{
lht (q(st+1) + d(xt+1)) + b
h
t
}
⊥ µht ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H,
0 ≤ lht ⊥ ν
h
t ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H,
where µh and νh denote the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the collateral and the short-selling
constraint of agent h.
4.4.2 Computational Performance
Before we look at errors in Euler equations, we first discuss how the kinks induced by the
short selling and collateral constraints are located within the state space. Figure 4.6 shows
the adapted grid for an exogenous state where the first agent is hit by a bad idiosyncratic
shock. To clearly visualize the kinks, we highlight the edges that connect adapted points.
The short selling constraint of the first agent induces a kink which has two components,
the one which lies almost on the y-axis and the curved one to the very right. Furthermore,
each of the collateral constraints induces one kink, where the kink from the first agent’s
constraint runs approximately parallel to the y-axis at about 0.08 fraction of wealth of
agent 1. In Figure 4.7 one can see how these kinks shape equilibrium an equilibrium pol-
icy function. The left hand picture displays the stock demand over the full state space,
whereas the picture on the right hand side displays a slice at 0.1 wealth fraction of agent
2. The distinct peak at 0.08 wealth fraction of agent 1 corresponds to the kink induced by
his collateral constraint. To the left, the collateral constraint is binding. At higher levels
of wealth his demand for the stock goes down until the short selling constraint becomes
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binding again.
As in Section 4.3.4, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm by computing relative
errors in Euler equations. In Table 4.7, we show results for equilbria computed with ASI
using two different values for the dividend parameter δ. For all other parameters, we use
the same calibration as for the Bond economy (see Appendix 4.E). Obviously, as the fig-
ures above suggest, more points are needed than in the bond model to bring Euler errors
down to reasonable values. Comparing the results from ASI with results on equidistant
grids, we find that for the same number of grid points, ASI outperforms equidistant grids
by approximately one order of magnitude in terms of maximum Euler Error. Again, we
ask how many points are needed to match the accuracy of ASI. Increasing the number of
points up to a factor of 20 yields almost the same maximum Euler Error, as the results
in Table 4.8 show. This factor is still substantial, however, not as high as for the Bond
model. The reason are non-linearities away from the kink, as can be seen in Figure 4.7.
We have developed an adaptation scheme that adapts the grid to non-linearities, which
further improves the relative performance of our algorithm. However, as this is not the
focus of this paper, we do not elaborate more on this.
Bond and Stock Economy
EE state space EE equilibrium path
δ points time(min) max EE ∅ EE max EE ∅ EE
0.10 1235(1250) 310(260) -2.5(−1.4) -3.8(−3.2) -3.1(−1.6) -4.1(−3.5)
0.25 1160(1225) 302(251) -2.2(−1.4) -3.3(−2.9) -2.2(−1.4) -3.4(−2.7)
Table 4.7: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
Bond and Stock Economy: Match Accuracy
EE state space EE equilibrium path
δ points time(min) max EE ∅ EE max EE ∅ EE
0.10 1235(25425) 310(4500) -2.5(−2.4) -3.8(−4.0) -3.1(−2.6) -4.1(−4.2)
0.25 1160(25425) 302(4812) -2.2(−2.1) -3.3(−4.2) -2.2(−2.3) -3.4(−4.4)
Table 4.8: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
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Figure 4.6: Bond and Stock Economy: Adapted Grid with Several Identified Kinks
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Figure 4.7: Bond and Stock Economy: 2D Stock Demand (lhs) and 1D Slice (rhs)
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper presents an algorithm that is tailor-made for computing equilibria in dynamic
models with occasionally binding constraints. To directly address the problem of kinks in
such models, we develop a new interpolation technique based on adaptive grids and sim-
plicial interpolation. We show that Adaptive Simplicial Interpolation accurately computes
equilibria in dynamic models with several continuous state variables and various inequality
constraints. Comparison studies show that our method outperforms standard grid tech-
niques by up to two orders of magnitude in terms of maximum errors in Euler equations.
Clearly, occasionally binding constraints become more and more important in quantitative
economics, e.g. in modeling financial frictions. We hope that ASI will help economists in
solving such models.
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Appendix
4.A Details Bond Economy
In this appendix, we define competitive equilibrium and derive first-order equilibrium con-
ditions for the bond economy presented in Section 4.2.1. For this purpose, some additional
notation is needed. We denote the shock at time t by xt, but the history of shocks that
occurred up to period t by xt. The set of histories up to period t is denoted by X t, and
the set of all possible histories by X ≡
⋃T
t=1X
t. For xt+1 being a possible successor of
xt we write xt+1 ≥ xt. Finally, the probability of history xt is denoted by pi(xt) and the
conditional transition probability by pi(xt+1 |xt)
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for an economy with agents’ initial bond holdings
(
bh0
)
h∈H
is a collection
{z(xt)}xt∈X ≡
{(
ch(xt), bh(xt)
)
h∈H
, p(xt)
}
xt∈X
of consumption allocations, bond holdings, and bond prices that satisfy the following con-
ditions:
1. Markets clear8:
∑
h∈H
bh(xt) = 0 ∀xt ∈ X.
2. Given prices (p(xt))xt∈X, each agent chooses
(
ch(xt), bh(xt))
)
xt∈X
8By Walras’ Law market clearing in the asset market(s) implies market clearing in the consumption
goods market.
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to maximize lifetime utility such that ∀xt ∈ X the following constraints hold:
budget constraint ch(xt) + bh(xt)p(xt) ≤ eh(xt) + bh(xt−1),
borrowing constraint bh(xt) ≥ b.
First-Order Equilibrium Conditions
Each individual agent faces the following optimization problem:
max
(c(xt),b(xt))xt∈X
E
[
T∑
t=1
βtu(c(xt))
]
s.t. ∀xt ∈ X :
budget constraint ch(xt) + bh(xt)p(xt) ≤ eh(xt) + bh(xt−1),
borrowing constraint bh(xt) ≥ b.
Denote the multiplier associated with these constraints by λ(xt) and µ(xt). Differentiating
the Lagrangian with respect to the different choice variables gives
c(xt) : pi(xt)βtu′(c(xt))− λ(xt) = 0
c(xt+1) : pi(xt+1)βt+1u′(c(xt+1))− λ(xt+1) = 0
b(xt) : −λ(xt)p(xt) + µ(xt) +
∑
xt+1≥xt
(
λ(xt+1)
)
= 0
Substituting the first two FOCs into the last one, we get the following Euler equation for
the bond:
−u′(c(xt))p(xt) + µ(xt) +
∑
xt+1≥xt
βpi(xt+1|xt)u′(c(xt+1)) = 0.
In addition, the Kuhn-Tucker FOCs include the following complementarity condition:
0 ≤ b(xt)− b ⊥ µ(xt) ≥ 0.
Combined with market clearing conditions and budget constraints, these are the equilib-
rium conditions stated in Section 4.2.1.
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4.B Details Bond and Stock Economy
In this appendix, we define competitive equilibrium and derive first-order equilibrium con-
ditions for the economy presented in Section 4.4. The notation is as introduced in the
beginning of Appendix 4.A.
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for an economy with agents’ initial portfolios
(
bh0 , l
h
0
)
h∈H
is a collection
{z(xt)}xt∈X ≡
{(
ch(xt), bh(xt), lh(xt)
)
h∈H
, p(xt), q(xt)
}
xt∈X
of consumption allocations, bond and stock holdings, and prices that satisfy the following
conditions:
1. Markets clear:
∑
h∈H
bh(xt) = 0,
∑
h∈H
lh(xt) = 1 ∀xt ∈ X.
2. Given prices (p(xt), q(xt))xt∈X, each agent chooses
(
ch(xt), bh(xt), lh(xt))
)
xt∈X
to maximize lifetime utility such that ∀xt ∈ X the following constraints hold:
budget constraint ch(xt) + bh(xt)p(xt) + lh(xt)q(xt) ≤
eh(xt) + bh(xt−1) + lh(xt−1)
(
qt(x
t) + dt(x
t)
)
,
short selling constraint lh(xt) ≥ 0 and
collateral constraints min
xt+1≥xt
{
lh(xt)
(
q(xt+1) + d(xt+1)
)
+ bh(xt)
}
≥ 0.
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First-Order Equilibrium Conditions
Each individual agent faces the following optimization problem:
max
(c(xt),b(xt),l(xt))xt∈X
E
[
T∑
t=1
βtu(c(xt))
]
s.t. ∀xt ∈ X :
budget constraint ch(xt) + bh(xt)p(xt) + lh(xt)q(xt) ≤
eh(xt) + bh(xt−1) + lh(xt−1)
(
qt(x
t) + dt(x
t)
)
,
short selling constraint lh(xt) ≥ 0 and
collateral constraints min
xt+1≥xt
{
lh(xt)
(
q(xt+1) + d(xt+1)
)
+ bh(xt)
}
≥ 0.
Denote the multipliers associated with these constraints by λ(xt), ν(xt), and µ(xt). Differ-
entiating the Lagrangian gives
c(xt) : pi(xt)βtu′(c(xt))− λ(xt) = 0
c(xt+1) : pi(xt+1)βt+1u′(c(xt+1))− λ(xt+1) = 0
b(xt) : −λ(xt)p(xt) + µ(xt) +
∑
xt+1≥xt
(
λ(xt+1)
)
= 0
l(xt) : ν(xt)− λ(xt)q(xt) + µ(xt) min
xt+1≥xt
{
q(xt+1) + d(xt+1)
}
+
∑
xt+1≥xt
(
λ(xt+1)
) (
q(xt+1) + d(xt+1)
)
= 0.
Substituting the first two FOCs into the last two, we get the following Euler equations for
the bond and the stock:
−u′(c(xt))p(xt) + µ(xt) +
∑
xt+≥xt
(
βpi(xt+1|xt)u′(c(xt+1))
)
= 0,
ν(xt)− u′(c(xt))q(xt) + µ(xt) min
xt+1≥xt
{
q(xt+1) + d(xt+1)
}
+
∑
xt+1≥xt
(
βpi(xt+1|xt)u′(c(xt+1))
) (
q(xt+1) + d(xt+1)
)
= 0.
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In addition, the Kuhn-Tucker FOCs include the following complementarity conditions:
0 ≤ min
xt+1≥xt
{
lh(xt)
(
q(xt+1) + d(xt+1)
)
+ bh(xt)
}
⊥ µ(xt) ≥ 0
0 ≤ l(xt) ⊥ ν(xt) ≥ 0.
Combined with market clearing conditions and budget constraints, these are the equilib-
rium conditions stated in Section 4.4.
4.C Transforming Complementarities into Equations
At the initial gridpoints, ASI solves the follwing complementarity problem:
Given a state s ∈ S , and functions
φ : S × Rm+n → Rm, ψ : S × Rm → Rn,
find policies and multipliers (z, µ) ∈ Rm × Rn,
s.t. φ(s, z, µ) = 0, 0 ≤ ψ(s, z) ⊥ µ ≥ 0.
Following Garcia and Zangwill (1981), we transform this complementarity problem into a
system of equations, to be able to apply a standard non-linear equation solver. Key to the
transformation are the following definitions:
α ≡

µ for µ ≥ 0, ψ(s, z) = 0−ψ(s, z) for µ = 0, ψ(s, z) > 0
and
α+ = (max(0, α))k
α− = (max(0,−α))k,
122 CHAPTER 4. COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA
where k ∈ N+. Using these definitions, the problem reads:
Given a state s ∈ S , and functions
φ : S × Rm+n → Rm, ψ : Rm → S × Rn,
find policies and alphas (z, α) ∈ Rm × Rn,
s.t. φ(s, z, α+) = 0, ψ(s, z)− α− = 0.
4.D Alternative Error Measure
As explained in Section 4.3.4, measuring accuracy in models with occasionally binding con-
straints using EEs is not unproblematic. We therefore suggest an alternative error measure.
To apply this measure we need to solve the equilibrium system (given the solution from
the time iteration algorithm as tomorrow’s policies) at the point in the state space where
we want to measure accuracy. From that solution, we get consumption values copt for all
agents. Then, we compare these values to the interpolated consumption values cint. In
spirit of the Euler Error we compute the relative deviation of the interpolated policy from
the optimal solution. Hence, the error is given by E =
∣∣∣ cintcopt − 1
∣∣∣. In the tables below we
report the maximum and average errors over the state space and along the equilibrium path
for the same examples as in Section 4.3.4. With respect to the alternative error measure,
ASI still outperforms standard equidistant grid schemes by far. However, the difference in
accuracy is not as extreme as with EEs.
Bond Economy with Three Agents
E state space E equilibrium path
b points time(min) max E ∅ E max E ∅ E
0.1 40(45) 0.5(0.4) -3.2(−2.6) -4.1(−3.5) -3.2(−2.6) -4.7(−4.0)
0.1 113(120) 1.1(1.0) -3.3(−2.5) -4.5(−3.6) -3.3(−2.5) -5.1(−4.2)
1.0 185(190) 6.5(4.5) -2.3(−1.7) -3.2(−3.0) -2.5(−1.7) -3.2(−2.7)
1.0 941(946) 13(11) -3.3(−2.3) -4.5(−3.6) -3.3(−2.5) -5.1(−3.3)
Table 4.9: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
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Bond Economy with Four Agents
E state space E equilibrium path
b points time(min) max E ∅ E max E ∅ E
0.1 112(120) 4.5(4) -2.9(−1.9) -3.5(−2.7) -2.9(−2.0) -4.0(−3.0)
1.0 914(969) 60(51) -1.9(−1.5) -2.7(−2.6) -1.9(−1.5) -2.8(−3.4)
Table 4.10: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
Bond and Stock Economy
E state space E equilibrium path
δ points time(min) max E ∅ E max E ∅ E
0.10 1235(1250) 310(260) -2.1(−1.8) -3.5(−3.4) -2.1(−1.8) -3.6(−3.4)
0.25 1160(1225) 302(251) -2.2(−1.8) -3.3(−2.2) -2.2(−1.9) -3.4(−3.2)
Table 4.11: Accuracy of Adaptive Grid (Equidistant Grid in Brackets)
4.E Parameterization
We set the discount factor β = 0.95 and the risk aversion parameter γ = 1.5 for all agents.
Concerning the exogenous shock process, we make the following choices: We assume that
agents may either receive a good or a bad idiosyncratic shock. One agent always gets the
bad shock and all others get the good one. This results in three or four states per aggregate
shock, depending on the number of agents. Allowing for two aggregate shocks the exoge-
nous part of the state space comprises six or eight states respectively. We denote the ratios
of good to bad idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks by νidio and νagg. We finally denote the
persistence of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks by ρidio and ρagg. We compute equilibria
for two values of the borrowing limit b, namely b = 0.1 and 1, i.e. borrowing up to 10% or
100% of average individual yearly income. All parameter values can be found in Table 4.12.
γ νidio νagg ρidio ρagg β b
1.5 1.6 1.06 0.9 0.65 0.95 0.1/1.0
Table 4.12: Parameter Values
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